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Militant or Bystander: How to Protect Democracy 
Amos N. Guiora* and Kristine J. Ingle** 
fK==fkqolar`qflk=
Over the course of the last two and half centuries, democracy has 
enfranchised millions across the globe, promoted the advancement of 
technology, encouraged the end of colonialism, and fostered peace in 
war- and conflict-plagued places. It is unfortunate, then, that democ-
racy has also facilitated the rise of some of the most murderous regimes 
in modern history. 
Mussolini and Hitler did not, after all, rise to power with the 
force of an army. They did not need armies. Pre-existing democratic 
institutions provided ample means with which to establish their new 
political orders, and the consequences for their formerly democratic 
societies and institutions have been thoroughly documented and end-
lessly discussed and analyzed. 
Within this context, we ask two core questions: how does the de-
mocracy pendulum swing so far in a dangerous direction and, be-
cause it can, how can we prevent it from doing so? These two questions 
are as relevant in 2018 as they were in 1922 and 1933; perhaps more 
so, given the dramatic political events taking place worldwide. A cas-
ual glance at today’s headlines illuminate attacks on democratic val-
ues, norms, and institutions. Such attacks come from within the very 
societies they threaten to crumble, from all quarters, from both the 
political left and right, and from traditional and immigrant                
communities alike. 
The question of how to resolve these tensions is a complicated one. 
Both the protection of democracy and the failure to protect it can, and 
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do, have disastrous consequences. History is replete with tragic exam-
ples of unwarranted, unlimited, and unrestrained manifestations of po-
litical, ideological, and religious extremism. 
The notion that democracy—its values and institutions—is under 
attack should be the key concern of elected officials, pundits, the gen-
eral public, jurists, and thought leaders. To suggest that this attack on 
democracy is a crisis is not an exaggeration. The question is how best 
to protect what is at risk. Protection is the central theme we address in 
this article. 
How to protect democracy is a most complicated inquiry, which 
cuts across inter-disciplinary lines, delving into jurisprudence, philos-
ophy, security, and politics. How democracies respond in 2018 will 
have both short-term and long-term impact. To that end, this article 
presents both a practical (tactical) and jurisprudential-philosophical 
(strategic) discussion. Given the threats to democracies and democratic 
values, there is a pressing need for this conversation. 
This article examines the pressing need of the hour through two 
distinct perspectives: militant democracy and bystander democracy. As 
will be explained in the pages that follow, the term militant democracy 
was coined by Professor Karl Loewenstein in the alarming years of the 
1930s, prior to the terrible events of the Second World War. By-
stander democracy reflects our spin on the original term in an effort to 
capture the unwillingness to directly confront pressing and immediate 
threats. The two terms, as we will come to see, are polar opposites. 
One reflects recognition of threats and the need and willingness to re-
spond. The other suggests a failure to recognize threats, an unwilling-
ness to confront threats, or a combination of the two. 
It is, however, insufficient to recognize threats. It is necessary to 
develop mechanisms, subject to the rule of law, that enable application 
of protective measures. The condition of these measures must be a re-
spect for the rule of law, subject to separation of powers, checks and 
balances, and judicial review. There is great tension and risk in this 
undertaking. In an effort to preserve democracy, there is always the 
possibility of over-stepping, resulting in unwarranted—and unin-
tended—negative ramifications. In other words, protections have 
costs. Sometimes those costs are justified to achieve the desired goal; 
other times, overstepping—in an effort to protect—results in unwar-
ranted minimization of individual rights. 
As history has shown, it is a particular challenge to balance these 
competing interests. Similarly, as repeatedly demonstrated, it is very 
(3) GUIORA.FINAL ARTICLE, POST PROOF, 2.6.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/6/2019  4:42 PM 
31] How to Protect Democracy 
33 
difficult to undo the damage of limiting rights. In other words, putting 
the proverbial genie back in the bottle poses great challenges to de-
mocracies seeking to protect themselves from internal threats. 
The questions we pose in this article are at the forefront of the 
challenges facing contemporary democracies. This is, then, a three-
step process: does the nation-state recognize an internal threat? And, 
if so, what measures does it take to protect against that threat? If the 
nation-state fails to recognize a threat, what are the consequences of 
that failure, deliberate or otherwise? 
To best illustrate our analysis, this article is comparative, in that 
we examine these questions through the contemporary lens of three 
different countries. In doing so, we seek to show how the three coun-
tries—Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands—resolve distinct domes-
tic threats. In undertaking a comparative analysis, we do not aim at 
equal billing amongst the three examined countries. Rather, we hope 
that by providing examples from the three countries we can sufficiently 
and compellingly demonstrate the profound dissonance between mili-
tant and bystander democracy. 
Recognizing the threat is an important step. The more difficult 
inquiry is how does democracy protect itself and what are the limits of 
such efforts. While protection is essential, democratic values and prin-
ciples impose limits and restraints. Otherwise, democracy is doomed 
to fail. In the same breath, democracy is at risk if protection measures 
are not considered, much less applied. Balance and limits are critical 
concepts. The thin line between protection of democracy and toler-
ance of challenges is tenuous. 
The failure to recognize—and respond—to an internal threat re-
flects bystander democracy. However, threats are nuanced. There are 
real and perceived threats. Mistaking one for the other can result in 
unjustified minimizations of individual rights, liberties, and privileges. 
Conversely, failing to recognize a direct threat can endanger individu-
als and the state alike. 
A perceived threat may ultimately prove itself to be real, but acting 
on perceived threats can be dangerous. There is a chance that a gov-
ernment may overreact to a perceived threat or that persons in power 
may exploit public fear, resulting in an unwarranted minimization of 
individual rights and leaving the individual with unavailable or          
limited recourse.  
On the other hand, waiting for a perceived threat to actualize is 
also risky. By the time the risk is direct—rather than perceived—the 
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opportunity to mitigate its impact may be significantly minimized and 
the proverbial point of no return may have been crossed. That conun-
drum highlights the militant-bystander tension. The question is who 
deserves protection, and from what aggressor? This is an essential 
query in determining the limits of democracy. 
There is a normal give and take in a democracy—like players in a 
contact sport switching from defense to offense over the course of a 
match. A vibrant democracy is comprised of engaged, determined, and 
sometimes aggressive constituents, whose discourse can be brusque 
and occasionally offensive. Such discourse is far preferable to an au-
thoritarian regime that does not tolerate dissent and where disobedi-
ence is harshly punished. Protecting democracy must allow for strident 
voices. The debate cannot be vanilla, or devoid of tension and strife. 
However, there is importance in line drawing regarding limits on per-




We come to this project from the perspective that protecting de-
mocracy, particularly from devolution into anarchy and authoritarian-
ism, is essential. Democracy is designed to protect itself; failing to pro-
tect is self-destructive. However, this effort should not require 
sacrificing essential democratic institutions in the name of preserving 
others. But we can place specific, narrowly-crafted limitations on cer-
tain institutions to prevent anti-democratic forces from using demo-
cratic institutions to dismantle democracy. 
Such a concept is not novel. In the years before World War II, 
Professor Karl Loewenstein coined the term “militant democracy.”1 
Loewenstein was a German Jew, fortunate to leave Germany in the 
immediate aftermath of Hitler’s rise to power and find safety and an 
intellectual home in the United States. Militant democracy is a term 
used today in parts of Europe with the understanding that different 
countries assign their own meaning. Put simply, a militant democracy 
is a democracy that protects itself by limiting certain liberties. In Loe-
wenstein’s words: 
 
 1. Karl Loewenstein, Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I, 31 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 417, 423–24 (1937). 
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If democracy is convinced that it has not yet fulfilled its destination, 
it must fight on its own plane a technique which serves only the pur-
pose of power. Democracy must become militant. . . . Democracy 
and democratic tolerance have been used for their own destruction. 
Under cover of fundamental rights and the rule of law, the anti-dem-
ocratic machine could be built up and set in motion legally. Calcu-
lating adroitly that democracy could not, without self-abnegation, 
deny to any body of public opinion the full use of the free institutions 
of speech, press, assembly, and parliamentary participation, fascist 
exponents systematically discredit the democratic order and make it 
unworkable by paralyzing its functions until chaos reigns. They ex-
ploit the tolerant confidence of democratic ideology that in the long 
run truth is stronger than falsehood, that the spirit asserts itself 
against force. Democracy was unable to forbid the enemies of its very 
existence the use of democratic instrumentalities. Until very recently, 
democratic fundamentalism and legalistic blindness were unwilling 
to realize that the mechanism of democracy is the Trojan horse by 
which the enemy enters the city. To fascism in the guise of a legally 
recognized political party were accorded all the opportunities of 
democratic institutions. 
 The main principle of democracy is the notion of legality. Fascism 
therefore officially annexed legality. Since experience acquired in 
other countries does not commend the coup d’état for the immediate 
conquest of the state, power is sought on the basis of studious legality. 
If possible, access is obtained to national and communal representa-
tive bodies. This purpose is facilitated by that gravest mistake of the 
democratic ideology, proportional representation. Democracies are 
legally bound to allow the emergence and rise of anti-parliamentar-
ian and anti-democratic parties under the condition that they con-
form outwardly to the principles of legality and free play of public 
opinion. It is the exaggerated formalism of the rule of law which un-
der the enchantment of formal equality does not see fit to exclude 
from the game parties that deny the very existence of its rules.2 
Importantly, while it is often conceptualized as protection of ma-
jority rule, militant democracy protects the interest of minorities and 
majorities alike. Every modern democracy places limitations on major-
ity rule, which in turn protects the interests of minority groups. Suc-
cessful militant democracies must tailor limitations of certain liberties 
with the interests of protected minorities in mind. 
 
 
 2. Id. 
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Nevertheless, as the term is used here, militant democracy refers 
to the limitation of certain freedoms in order to respond to an internal 
threat that seeks to destroy democracy from within its institution. But 
because of the very nature of democracy, limiting liberties in an effort 
to prevent democracy’s destruction must be “narrowly tailored”3 to 
meet the threat. 
In tension with the concept of a militant democracy is a bystander 
democracy. It reflects a critical discussion point in contemporary soci-
ety, and recalls Winston Churchill’s tragically prescient warnings in 
the face of Neville Chamberlin’s “peace for our time”4 after signing the 
Munich Agreement. The bystander democracy is a democracy that 
fails to preserve itself by willfully turning a blind eye to current or 
clearly foreseeable threats. Specifically, bystander democracies are 
those that fail to answer threats seeking to dismantle democracy 
through its own institutions. In other words, those very institutions are 
at risk from within. 
A.  Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands 
This article discusses the tension between militant and bystander 
democracy in Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands. We chose these 
three countries both for practical and research purposes. From a prac-
tical perspective, one of us lives in Israel and travels to all three. From 
a research perspective, the three countries are at the epicenter of many 
of the tensions inherent to the militant-bystander democracy debate. 
We have also chosen to reference specific examples in the United 
States, as they provide important contemporary illustrations. 
The three countries face a contemporary threat to democracy that, 
like all true and lasting threats, has been fostered from within. In the 
Netherlands, the country faces a growing jihadist movement among 
 
 3. We use this term with the understanding that “narrowly tailored” has a specific mean-
ing in United States law. 
  4. Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of the U.K., Address after the Munich Confer-
ence: Peace for Our Time (Sept. 30, 1983). 
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Dutch-Moroccans.5 In Germany, as evidenced by the most recent elec-
tion,6 it is the combined rise of the far-right and an increase in anti-
Semitism amongst immigrant communities.7 In Israel, it is a palpable 
racism directed at Israeli Arabs and fostered by active right-wing ide-
ologues, who identify the “left” and the “media” as enemies of the 
state.8 The legal and political responses to these threats manifest the 
militant-bystander democracy tension. 
To avoid repeating history’s mistakes, Israel, Germany, and the 
Netherlands must resolve how to address threats they face today. In 
examining the militant-bystander democracy tension and proposing 
resolution mechanisms, we are all too aware of the consequences for 
failing to do so. The litany above illustrates the consequences resulting 
from dangerous elements, and their supporters, who legally abuse de-
mocracy. That is, when societies lose their balance, moral compass, 
firm grounding, and any semblance of humanity. It is for that reason, 
then, that democracies must be on full alert to anything that potentially 
undermines their core, stability, and essence. In the examples below, 
we discuss how those dangerous elements, when in positions of 
 
 5. Dutch Muslims are Becoming More Religious, New SCP Report Shows, 
DUTCHNEWS.NL (June 8, 2018), https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2018/06/dutch-muslims-are-
becoming-more-religious-new-scp-report-shows/; Rob Bertholee, Jihadism on the Rise in Eu-
rope: The Dutch Perspective, WASH. INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/jihadism-on-the-rise-in-europe-the-
dutch-perspective; COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, THE NETHERLANDS: EXTREMISM & 
COUNTER-TERRORISM, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/N 
L-07132017.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
 6. Paul Kirby, German Election: Why This is a Turning Point, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41094785; Elizabeth Schumacher, German 
Election Results: Disappointing Victory for Angela Merkel as CDU Sinks, Nationalist AfD 
Surges, DW (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-disappointing-
victory-for-angela-merkel-as-cdu-sinks-nationalist-afd-surges/a-40666430. 
 7. Amos Guiora, Opinion, Germany Must Confront Its New Wave of Anti-Semitism – 
Even If Those Behind It Aren’t German, WASH. POST (May 9, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/05/09/germany-must-confront-its-new-wave-of-
antisemitism-even-if-those-behind-it-arent-german/?utm_term=.aae59711d361  [hereinafter 
Guiora, Germany Must Confront Its New Wave of Anti-Semitism]; Amos Guiora, Wannsee 
Villa and the Bystander in the Holocaust, FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/05/wannsee-villa-and-the-bystander-in-the-holocaust/ [here-
inafter Guiora, Wannsee Villa]; Cnaan Liphshiz, No Link Between Muslim Immigration and 
Anti-Semitism, German Study Says, TIMES OF ISR. (May 30, 2018), https://www.timesofis-
rael.com/no-link-between-muslim-immigration-and-anti-semitism-german-study-says/;  Ger-
man-Jewish Girl, 14, Found Raped and Murdered, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (June 7, 
2018), https://www.jta.org/2018/06/07/global/german-jewish-girl-14-found-raped-murdered. 
 8. Prime Minister Netanyahu has made this very clear. See TOI Staff, Full Text of Net-
anyahu’s Speech at Likud Rally, TIMES OF ISR. (Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.timesofis-
rael.com/full-text-of-netanyahus-speech-at-likud-rally/. 
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power and influence, have managed to undermine democracy by using 
democratic means.  
How far to go in preserving this balance is a complex inquiry. One 
approach reflects a case-by-case perspective; another suggests that a 
bright-line strategy structures the discussion best. Both perspectives 
have validity and weaknesses alike. We will address this in the pages 
that follow. We will focus our discussion through the lens of limits on 
free speech and, in particular, the banning of political parties. 
B.  Freedoms and Their Limits 
Freedom of speech, especially in the political context, is a corner-
stone of every modern democracy, including Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Israel. Freedom of association, as manifested in political par-
ties, has been essential to the development of each of the democracies 
we discuss. Together, these two liberties assure that the marketplace 
of ideas flourishes and the individual’s right to political representation 
is preserved. 
Nevertheless, history’s lesson is that limitless speech and limitless 
representation are dangerous tools in the hands of those who would 
seek to undermine democracy. It is possible that democratic processes 
might be used to topple a democracy. The question, then, is at what 
point does limiting political liberties preserve democracy? 
Pointing an accusatory finger against a paper tiger is easy and dan-
gerous. Recognizing the true threat—and acting against it—is more 
complicated and fraught with political risk. To highlight, the seem-
ingly endless attacks by Prime Minister Netanyahu against the Israeli 
media—very similar to President Trump’s tweets against “fake 
news”9—portray the media as “the enemy” endangering Israeli society 
and national security.10 
Both Trump and Netanyahu take an approach that reflects politi-
cal calculations and considerations. From a purely electoral perspec-
tive, their actions are understandable, satisfying the desires of their 
 
  9. See Matt Viser & Yan Wu, 11 Months, 1 President, 2,417 Tweets, BOS. GLOBE, 
https://apps.bostonglobe.com/opinion/graphics/2017/12/president-twitter/ (last visited Nov. 
20, 2018). 
 10. See Dan Perry & Josef Federman, Channeling Trump? Beleaguered Netanyahu As-
sails Media, AP NEWS (Aug 10, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/3c08b1e8e17c41d58115be5f4 
8463f7a; James Doubek, Hundreds of Newspapers Denounce Trump’s Attacks on Media in Co-
ordinated Editorials, NPR (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/16/639125774/hun-
dreds-of-newspapers-denounce-trumps-attacks-on-media-in-coordinated-editorial. 
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“base.”11 It does not, however, reflect the militant-bystander democ-
racy paradigm at the core of our analysis. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note the danger of pointing a finger at, if not attacking, easy targets 
as compared to the forces that genuinely threaten democracy and the 
state. The distinction between the two is essential to understanding the 
militant-bystander democracy discussion. 
With the problem framed in this manner, we reference an extraor-
dinary speech by Professor Rudolph Pabus Cleveringa, Dean of 
the Faculty of Law, University of Leiden (the Netherlands). Clev-
eringa delivered his speech on November 26, 1940 after Jewish faculty 
members at the University of Leiden were dismissed. Amongst those 
dismissed was Professor Meijers, who that morning had received a let-
ter from the Department of Education, Arts, and Sciences inform-
ing him of his dismissal in the aftermath of the German occupation of 
the Netherlands.12 
The speech unsparingly articulated deep anxiety about the threats 
the Netherlands faced: 
 I pass on this message to you, stark as it is, and make no attempt 
to qualify it further. I fear that any words I could find, however I 
might choose them, would fail to convey the grievous and bitter emo-
tions that this message has aroused in me and in my colleagues, and, 
I am convinced, also in you and in countless other people within and 
– in so far as this comes to their notice – beyond our borders. I believe 
I am relieved of any need to interpret these emotions because I sense 
that the same thoughts and feelings are being communicated back 
and forth between us, without the need for words, yet completely and 
precisely understood by all of us. 
 It is not for the purpose of any such interpretation that I request 
permission to address a few words to you; if I had no other aim than 
to emphasise [sic] our state of mind, I would, I believe, have no better 
 
 11. Perhaps no Israeli politician does it in such a crass and strident manner as the Minister 
of Sport and Culture, Miri Regev, whose outrageous reaction to the Argentinian decision to 
withdraw from a “soccer friendly” with the Israeli national team manifests “playing to the base” 
in its most vulgar manner. See Michael Bachner, Culture Minister: Argentina Soccer Match Can-
celed Over Terrorism, Not a Boycott, TIMES OF ISR. (June 6, 2018), https://www.timesofis-
rael.com/culture-minister-argentina-soccer-cancellation-not-a-boycott-its-terrorism/;  Ravit 
Hecht, Thank You, Miri Regev, HAARETZ (June 8, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/opin-
ion/.premium—1.6157186; TOI Staff, Most Think Minister Wrong to Move Argentina Soccer 
Match to Jerusalem–Poll, TIMES OF ISR. (June 7, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/most-
think-minister-wrong-to-move-argentina-soccer-match-to-jerusalem-poll/. 
 12. Germany occupied the Netherlands on May 14, 1940. 
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instrument than to end here and to leave you to the icy oppressive-
ness of the horrifying silence that would immediately descend upon 
us. Nor shall I with my words try to direct your thoughts towards 
those people who were the originators of this letter, the contents of 
which I have reported to you. Their very act speaks for itself. All I 
desire is to remove them from our sight, leaving them beneath us, 
and to direct your eyes upwards to the resplendent figure of the per-
son to whom we owe our presence here.13 
Hearing the unvarnished truth is essential in framing the protec-
tion debate. Cleveringa did not soft-pedal his concern regarding the 
gravity of that time. That was not his intention. Without utilizing the 
term, he issued a clear warning to his audience of the perils of acting 
as bystanders in the face of the Nazi threat and warned of the conse-
quences of failing to protect democratic institutions. 
In the spirit of Professor Cleveringa’s, our discussion will articu-
late the gravity of the threats that Israel, Germany, and the Nether-
lands face today. 
fffK==qeb=jfifq^kqJ_vpq^kabo=abjl`o^`v=m^o^afdj=
As noted previously, militant democracy is a concept proposed and 
developed in the mid-twentieth century by German scholar and      
émigré Karl Loewenstein. For our purposes, bystander democracy 
points to a failure to protect democracy from internal threats and    
challenges. Ultimately, bystander democracy resigns itself to the         
actions of anti-democratic threats; institutions, society, and people 
bear the consequences. 
While the engineers of bystander democracy may foresee the dan-
gerous ramifications of their inaction, they nevertheless choose not to 
minimize the threats posed by those forces. In other words, they turn 
a blind eye to potential dangers. The challenge, needless to say, is to 
correctly identify the threats, rather than creating—for purposes of po-
litical expedience—false enemies. 
The bystander democracy is similar to the “pacifist” democracy 
suggested by Loewenstein in the 1930s.14 Pacifist democracies are not 
 
 13. Rudolph Cleveringa, Dean of the Faculty of Law, Univ. of Leiden, Protest Address by 
Professor Cleveringa, (Nov. 26, 1940), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/as-
sets/algemeen/oraties/cleveringa-oratie/teksten/protest-speech-rudolph-cleveringa.pdf. 
 14. PAUL CLITEUR & BASTIAAN RIJPKEMA, The Foundations of Militant Democracy, in 
THE STATE OF EXCEPTION AND MILITANT DEMOCRACY IN A TIME OF TERROR 235 (Afshin 
Ellian & Gelijn Molier eds., 2012). 
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equipped to combat internal challenges to democracy. Consequently, 
when an anti-democratic challenge arises, it is likely to succeed, as the 
bystander democracy is ill-equipped—whether deliberately or not—to 
combat internal anti-democratic forces resulting in a failure to chal-
lenge these forces. This is distinct from a nascent democracy, such as 
Egypt during the “Arab Spring,”15 that has not had to previously en-
counter such a challenge.16 Bystander democracy reflects either an un-
fortunate political consideration or a failure to learn from history’s les-
sons, thereby allowing anti-democratic forces to succeed through 
democratic means. 
Conversely, a militant democracy takes an opposite approach. The 
ultimate implementation of successful militant democratic principles, 
when applied in accordance with democratic principles, is to prevent 
the dissolution of democracy through democratic means. 
True internal threats to democracy, like fascism of the twentieth 
century, ultimately seek to gain and hold power, “for the sake of power 
alone.”17 While they may operate under the guise of a particular ideol-
ogy, the ultimate goal is usurpation of the power that a democratic 
government wields by and for the people. For example, fascism in Italy 
and Germany marketed itself as a nationalist antidote to the increas-
ingly popular socialist movements of the time. But the primary goal of 
fascism was the usurpation of power by its leaders. In such circum-
stances, Loewenstein explained that, “[i]f democracy is convinced that 
it has not yet fulfilled its destination, it must fight on its own plane a 
technique which serves only the purpose of power. Democracy must 
become militant.”18 
Importantly, in protecting themselves from anti-democratic 
threats, successful militant democracies must tailor their responses to 
the nature of that threat. At its core, “[d]emocracy ‘stands for funda-
mental rights, for fair play for all opinions, for free speech, assembly, 
 
 15. Ahmed Aboulenein et al., Major Events in Egypt Since Arab Spring Uprising, 
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-election-timeline/major-
events-in-egypt-since-arab-spring-uprisings-idUSKBN1H217Y; Egypt: Timeline of the Arab 
Spring Since Hosni Mubarak’s Ouster, TELEGRAPH (June 24, 2012), https://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/9343198/Egypt-timeline-of-the-Ara 
b-Spring-since-Hosni-Mubaraks-ouster.html. 
 16. Certain circumstances make a democracy more vulnerable to authoritarian and auto-
cratic threats from within. The age and economic state of a democracy are two such circum-
stances. 
 17. See Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 422. 
 18. Id. at 423. 
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press.’”19 Militant democracies cannot, and should not, throw the baby 
out with the bath water. There is just as much danger, if not more, in 
placing too many limitations on democratic freedoms in an attempt to 
meet anti-democratic threats. The tools of militant democracy must 
be carefully utilized and critically chosen. 
The militant response must be only enough, but not more than 
enough, to address the threat. Accordingly, a sliding scale of militant 
response is appropriate. We have provided an example of such a scale 
in the table below. While there is certainly no one-size-fits-all re-
sponse to anti-democratic threats, the danger of misusing militant de-
mocracy cannot be overstated. As we provide concrete examples of 
militant democracy, it is important to consider and recognize how its 
tools might be abused. 
 
Nature of the Threat 
 




Party advocates for   
violence/religious or 
racial extremism 
Banning of the 
party or refusal 
of registration 
If the party has enough 
support, banning can 
only alienate and incite 
the party’s base 
Individual politician 




If one politician is  
silenced, another steps in 
Individual politician 
promotes extremist 
views outside of the 
political process  
Subject to   
incitement and 
hate speech laws 
Sanctioning speech   
invokes more support for 




The tools with which militant democracies address anti-demo-
cratic threats include, but are not limited to, the banning of political 
parties and limitations on speech, in accordance with either national 
laws and/or a national constitution.20 
 
 19. Id. at 430–31. 
 20. Israel does not, for historical-political reasons, have a constitution, but rather a series 
of basic laws. See Amnon Rubinstein, Israel’s Partial Constitution: The Basic Laws, JEWISH 
VIRTUAL LIBR. PUBLICATIONS (Apr. 2009), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/isdf/te
xt/Rubinstein.pdf; GIDEON SAPIR ET. AL., Introduction: Israeli Constitutional Law at the Cross-
roads, in DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 1 LS17, 1-5, 
http://www.tau.ac.il/law/barakerez/articals/E%2051%20Sapir%20Ch1.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 
2018). 
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As stated earlier, we will focus primarily on the banning of political 
parties, understanding it has implications for free speech. In doing so, 
we cannot, and should not, ignore the severity and impact of such 
tools. But this alone should not deter their use. There are circum-
stances that demand a dramatic response that a democracy must have 
in its arsenal as a means to address internal threats. The question is one 
of application. That is, whether protecting democracy stays within the 
contours of balancing and respecting individual rights while, similarly, 
protecting society. 
In order to address these threats, many modern democracies have 
embraced militant-democratic principles to varying degrees of success 
and effectiveness. The United States, for example, has passed                
legislation that criminalizes individuals and actors who wish to over-
throw the government and have denied rights to Communist parties.21 
Other democracies employ the tools of militant democracy less specif-
ically. Rather than directing legislation at one political ideology or type 
of democratic threat, countries like Germany and Israel have adopted 
provisions that seek to protect against internal threats to                         
democracy generally. 
In Germany, both statutes and constitutional law provide a basis 
for militant-democratic principles. The Federal Constitutional Court 
has defined the “free democratic basic order,” which supplies protec-
tion for the individual freedoms of the German people as well as a sep-
aration of government powers and the security of a democratic form 
of government.22 However, the Basic Law provides that those free-
doms are forfeited when they are abused for the purpose of combatting 
“the free democratic basic order.”23 
Germany, like the United States, also recognizes the importance 
of political freedoms of speech and assembly. But, Article 21 Section 2 
of the Basic Laws also allows for the banning of political parties, pro-
vided that sufficiently substantial justifications are present.24 In addi-
tion, Article 20 Section 4 allows individual German people to invoke 
the protection of the law and “resist any person seeking to abolish th[e] 
 
 21. Angela K. Bourne, The Proscription of Political Parties and “Militant Democracy,” 7 
J. COMP. L. 196, 200 (2012). 
 22. THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 116–17 
(Markus Thiel ed., 2009). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 123. 
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constitutional order.”25 Germany has exercised the principles to outlaw 
a party twice. In both instances, the government banned extremist   
parties shortly after the end of World War II. The neo-Nazi Socialist 
Reich Party was outlawed in 1952 and the German Communist Party 
was outlawed in 1956. Since then, Germany has unsuccessfully             
attempted to ban the National Democratic Party on multiple               
occasions, including as recently as 2016.26 Ultimately, Germany’s laws 
and constitution recognize that the banning of political parties is a   
dramatic action, and reserves such an action for when there is a true 
and imminent threat.27 
While Germany’s constitutional approach to militant principles is 
perhaps unique, its party banning provisions are not. Israel, a democ-
racy that is not bound by or built upon a constitution, also provides for 
the banning of political parties. Without a constitution, Israel relies on 
the Knesset (Parliament) and the Supreme Court sitting as the High 
Court of Justice (known by its acronym BAGATZ) to define and create 
boundaries for individual and political rights. 
The Knesset passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance in 
1948. Clauses 4(a) and 4(b) of the Ordinance punish oral or written 
dissemination or even publicity of “words of praise, sympathy, or en-
courage[ment]” for violent acts.28 The Ministry of the Interior has the 
authority to decline to recognize certain political groups on the basis 
that they deny the “legitimacy of the existence of the state of Israel.”29 
The Ministry of the Interior’s decision is then subject to review by the 
BAGATZ .30 It is the prerogative of the BAGATZ to determine, even 
on the basis of “supra-constitutional principles,” whether a political 
party or organization is entitled to rights under Israeli law.31 
The Israeli Central Elections Commission has similar authority in 
regard to registering political parties and historically has exercised its 
 
 25. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] Art. 20(4), translation at https://www.bundesre-
gierung.de/breg-en/chancellor/basic-law-470510. 
 26. Melissa Eddy, German Court Rejects Effort to Ban Neo-Nazi Party, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/world/europe/german-court-far-right.html. 
 27. Id. 
 28. THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES, supra note 
22, at 188–89. 
 29. Id. at 189. 
 30. MARGIT COHN ET. AL., Religion and the High Court of Justice: Part 1, 39 IMAGE 
AND REALITY (2003), https://en.idi.org.il/publications/7854; The High Court of Justice, 
KNESSET.GOV.IL, https://knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bagatz_eng.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 31. THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES, supra note 
22, at 189–90. 
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authority to ban certain parties it deems a threat to democracy. Un-
der Section 5 of the Parties Law, the Commission may deny registra-
tion to any party whose purpose negates “the existence of Israel as a 
Jewish Democratic State,” incites racism, or may reasonably be de-
duced to be a cover for illegal actions.32 In addition to the Parties Law, 
the Basic Law also prohibits an individual candidate whose deeds or 
purposes denies the State of Israel as a Jewish Democratic State, incites 
racism, and supports the “armed struggle of an enemy state or a          
terrorist organization . . . .”33 
In addition, the Israeli Penal Law provides a criminal penalty for 
incitement to racism as well as incitement to rebellion. Section 144A 
defines racism, defines the instrumentalities of incitement, and pro-
vides for a penalty and religious exception to the law’s application.34 
Section 136 of the Penal Law defines incitement to rebellion, which 
includes the following: “disloyalty to the state or its institutions,” stim-
ulation of “bad will and discontent,” and the creation of “hostility and 
enmity” among the population.35 Israel has applied the principles of 
militant democracy, legislatively and judicially, against both far-right 
Jewish extremists and Israeli-Arab extremists.36 
Consider the differences and similarities in the German and Israeli 
approaches to militant democracy. Many of these differences are due 
to the dramatic disparities in culture, history, and demographics. De-
spite these differences, however, Germany and Israel have reached the 
conclusion that concrete militant democratic principles are worthy      
of codification. 
A.  Examples of Bystander-Democratic Principles in Contemporary 
Law 
In contrast to the militant-democratic principles that Israel and 
Germany have adopted into their laws and constitution, the Dutch ap-
proach to anti-democratic extremism fits into a separate category. Like 
the United States, the Netherlands has adopted tolerance as the model 
 
 32. Parties Law, 5718-1958, § 5 (as amended) (Isr.). 
 33. THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES supra note 
22, at 193. 
 34. Penal Laws, 5737-1977, § 144 (as amended) (Isr.). 
 35. THE ‘MILITANT DEMOCRACY’ PRINCIPLE IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES supra note 
22, at 194–95. 
 36. Id. at 202. 
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for its militant-democratic principles. Following the tolerance model, 
the approach of both countries is to place as few limitations on per-
sonal and political freedom as possible without clearly compromising 
the safety of the country. 
According to the militant-democratic model, maximum liberty is 
the ultimate defense mechanism for democracy. The marketplace of 
ideas is self-regulating, and allowing anti-democratic ideologies into 
that marketplace does not pose a real threat to democracy.37 In a tol-
erant democracy, the balance is struck in favor of personal liberty and 
the consequences of striking such a balance are considered minimal 
and necessary. 
But there can be a cost to unlimited and nearly unlimited liberties. 
Germany in the 1930s suffered the consequences of such democratic 
freedom. When the Weimar Republic fell into economic crisis, its laws 
and constitution left open the door for the extremist party that even-
tually assumed power.38 Of course, the circumstances that led to the 
rise of the National Socialist Party were neither singular nor simple.39 
But without the current constitutional framework acting as a last resort 
safety measure, the Nazis successfully used Germany’s nascent demo-
cratic process to rise to power and assume control of Germany. The 
results, of course, were devastating.40 
While the Netherlands today does not suffer the same economic, 
cultural, political, and historical challenges that Germany faced then, 
without legal safeguards in place, the Netherlands may nevertheless 
struggle with extremist parties. Current Dutch law provides similar 
means of regulating political speech and extremist parties as other tol-
erant democracies. Dutch criminal law disallows incitement to vio-
lence and hate speech.41  
The Netherlands Supreme Court has determined that political 
speech is included in hate speech.42 This characterization, played out 
 
 37. Id. at 391–92. 
 38. Angela K. Bourne & Fernando Casal Bértoa, Mapping ‘Militant Democracy’: Varia-
tion in Party Ban Practices in European Democracies (1945-2015), 13 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 1, 
7 (2017). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 8. 
 42. Max Bearak, ‘Prosecuted for What Millions Think:’ Netherlands Hate Speech Trial 
Restarts  for  Geert  Wilders,  WASH.  POST  (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/14/prosecuted-for-what-millions-think-geert-wilderss-hate-spee 
ch-trial-gets-green-light/?utm_term=.a2acb5a35196. 
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in the trial of Dutch Member of Parliament Geert Wilders—who was 
publicly for “fewer Moroccans”43—which is discussed at length in the 
following section. The application of Dutch law in Wilder’s case raises 
the following question: is the call for fewer members of a specific race 
of individuals an anti-democratic principle? And if so, do incitement 
and hate crime laws sufficiently address the anti-democratic nature of 
the speech? 
While Dutch law may address some speech of an individual politi-
cian, it does not allow the proscription of a political platform in its 
entirety. Unlike Germany and Israel, there is no filtering mechanism 
for anti-democratic parties. Whatever the preferred characterization 
of Geert Wilders and his views on immigration, neither his party nor 
platform are subject to regulation.  
In instances where there is a clearer threat, as the Nazis were in 
the 1930s, a lack of means to address such a threat can make even the 
most democratic of governments complicit in that threat. If the polit-
ical party is officially recognized by the system, it is legitimized in the 
eyes of the people. In such an instance, the system of government, and 
more specifically the political system, becomes a bystander to threat. 
Perhaps one of the most important and difficult questions to an-
swer in this context is where and how to exercise militant-democratic 
principles.44 There are certain types of threats that may warrant certain 
responses. And, importantly, an overreaction to a minor threat in and 
of itself can threaten democracy. Placing a limitation on a democratic 
freedom should be the last response. 
Imagine a world where every time a political party proposed some-
thing that the majority in the government did not like, the members 
of that party were censored. Such a response would be counterintui-
tive. An overreaction minimizes the legitimacy of the system. The  
people and structures in power must remember that, because             
fairness and liberty are at the heart of modern democracy, their actions 
cannot place undue burdens on minority beliefs, regardless of their    
personal feelings. 
Of course, this raises another question: what constitutes an unfair 
burden? The history and demography of a particular democracy have 
to be the foremost consideration in this inquiry. The solution for one 
democracy could very well be ineffective and ultimately damaging to 
 
 43. Id. 
   44. See Table 1. 
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another. In other words, what is good for Germany is not applicable 
to the Netherlands. 
fsK==qeobb=`lkqbjmlo^ov=`^pb=pqrafbpW=fpo^biI=
dboj^kvI=^ka=qeb=kbqeboi^kap=
Within a conceptual understanding of militant- and bystander-
democratic principles in mind, we turn to contemporary examples of 
these principles in action. Beginning with Israel, and moving to Ger-
many and then the Netherlands, our discussion focuses on how the 
unique laws and history of each country has impacted how their gov-
ernments have defended, or struggled to defend, its democratic insti-
tutions against threats from within. 
A.  Israel 
Extremism in Israel, as relevant to this discussion, refers to the 
combustible combination of religious extremism, nationalism, and rac-
ism. Our focus is on internal Israeli politics, not the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict or Palestinian terrorism. That is not to deny the obvious—
there are significant national security threats confronting Israeli deci-
sion makers including Iran, Palestinian terrorism, Hezbollah, and con-
tinued instability in Syria. These security threats cannot be denied. 
As legitimate as these actual, national security threats are, they do 
not justify tolerating other threats, internal in nature, posed by the Is-
raeli political right. That threat reflects a combustible combination of 
nationalism, religious extremism, and racism. As noted in the intro-
duction, we seek to explore two mechanisms of militant democracy: 
the limits of free speech and banning of political parties. 
Political parties have previously been banned in Israel. We will ex-
plore why and how this has occurred in an effort to suggest a balanced 
approach between militant and bystander democracy. The phrase my 
brown shirts, your brown shirts—when applied to Israel—suggests an 
extreme right-wing, fascist in orientation, recalling the dark days of 
European fascism.45 After all, the brown shirts worn by Hitler’s Storm 
 
 45. See generally Roger Hudson, Hitler Youth and Italian Fascists: Dressing the Part, 62 
HIST. TODAY (Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.historytoday.com/roger-hudson/hitler-youth-and-ital-
ian-fascists-dressing-part. 
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Troopers were patterned after the black shirts worn by Mussolini’s fas-
cists.46 The anti-Arab racism, extremism, and violence of the Israeli far 
right tragically resembles an earlier period. 
The threat posed by the dark forces of hate are emboldened by the 
wink and nod policy of the present government. That reflects tolerat-
ing intolerance that endangers both members of a particular ethnic 
group and larger society. The former because of physical and verbal 
abuse directed at them; the latter because the tenuous threads of soci-
ety are threatened when violence is predicated on racial, ethnic, and 
religious lines. That threat highlights the tension between militant and 
bystander democracy. 
This tension was highlighted by the Israeli commentator Chemi 
Shalev in his powerful article “Berlin, 1933 and Jerusalem, 2014: 
When Racist Thugs Are on the Prowl,”47 which he wrote in the after-
math of the horrific murder of 16-year-old Muhammed Abu Khdeir, 
burned to death by three Israelis.48 The act did not occur in a vacuum; 
it came on the heels of the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli ye-
shiva students by two Palestinians.49 That, however, is not intended to 
justify or excuse the horrific act. It is intended to highlight the danger 
that arises when criminals take the law into their own hands, seeking 
retribution against a convenient, innocent individual whose ethnicity 
alone makes him a legitimate target. 
The response to the murder of the three Israeli students was both 
a dramatic increase in anti-Arab sentiment amongst the Israeli political 
right and the government’s decision to forcefully engage Hamas, the 
Islamic extremist terror group that controls the Gaza Strip. Shalev’s 
article primarily focused on the violent racism of Jewish fascists fol-
lowing at that time.50 
There is a direct link between Shalev’s article and our article: in 
examining the tension between militant and bystander democracy, we 
are exploring whether—and how—the state responds to those who 
 
 46. SA: Nazi Organization, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,  https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/SA-Nazi-organization (last visited Oct. 19, 2018). 
 47. Chemi Shalev, Berlin, 1993 and Jerusalem, 2014: When Racist Thugs Are on the 
Prowl, HAARETZ  (July 2, 2014),  https://www.haaretz.com/blogs/west-of-eden/.premium-1.602 
697. 
 48. AFP & TOI Staff, Israeli Man Handed Life in Prison for Grisly Murder of East Jeru-
salem Teen, TIMES OF ISR. (May 3, 2016), https://www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-killer-of-east-
jerusalem-teen-handed-life-in-prison/. 
 49. Shalev, supra note 47. 
 50. Id. 
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seek to harm society in general and individuals in particular. As we 
have repeatedly come to see, it is not a given that the state fully re-
sponds to threats from within. That is the case even when the threat is 
neither vague nor amorphous, but real and visceral. Innocent individ-
uals have been threatened, injured, and murdered by violent extrem-
ists. The extremists are motivated by religion and nationalism. How to 
effectively counter this threat is an issue that is essential to the militant-
bystander democracy discussion. 
No responsible Israeli politician can ignore these threats; to do so 
is at his peril, for the forces of extremism and hatred know no 
bounds and are not deterred by mere rhetoric. More than that, extrem-
ists understand doublespeak well and read between the lines when pol-
iticians speak with a nod and a wink. This creates, or at least enables, a 
culture of tolerance fostering intolerance. We ignore the threat of ex-
tremism at our own peril. Turning a blind eye, sticking our head in 
the sand, and dismissing threats is, as history repeatedly demonstrates, 
a calculated risk. It results in harm that could have been                         
otherwise prevented. 
In characterizing these dangers Shalev wrote: 
Both my parents lost their families during World War II, 
and I need no convincing that the Holocaust is a crime so unique 
in its evil totality that it stands by itself even in the annals of other 
premeditated genocides. 
 But I am a Jew, and there are scenes of the Holocaust that are 
indelibly etched in my mind, even though I was not alive at the time. 
And when I saw the videos and pictures of gangs of right-wing Jewish 
racists running through the streets of Jerusalem, chanting “Death to 
the Arabs,” hunting for random Arabs, picking them out by their ap-
pearance or by their accents, chasing them in broad daylight, “drool-
ing like hysterical beasts” and then beating them up before the police 
could arrive - the historical association was automatic. It was the first 
thing that jumped into my mind. It should have been, I think, the 
first thing that jumped into any Jew’s mind. 
 Israel in 2014, it goes without saying, is not “The Garden of 
Beasts” that Erik Larson wrote about in his book on 1933 Germany. 
The Israeli government does not condone vigilantism or thuggery, 
as the Nazis did for a while, before Germans started complaining 
about the disorder on their streets and the damage to Berlin’s inter-
national reputation. I have no doubt that the police will also do their 
utmost to apprehend the murderers of the Palestinian boy  
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whose burnt body was found in a Jerusalem forest. I am even praying 
that they find that the killing wasn’t a hate crime at all. 
 But make no mistake: the gangs of Jewish ruffians man-hunting 
for Arabs are no aberration. Theirs was not a one-time outpouring 
of uncontrollable rage following the discovery of the bodies of the 
three kidnapped students. Their inflamed hatred does not exist in a 
vacuum: it is an ongoing presence, growing by the day, encompassing 
ever larger segments of Israeli society, nurtured in a public environ-
ment of resentment, insularity and victimhood, fostered and fed by 
politicians and pundits - some cynical, some sincere - who have 
grown weary of democracy and its foibles and who long for an Israel, 
not to put too fine a point on it, of one state, one nation and, some-
where down the line, one leader.51 
Shalev is not prone to hyperbole. That is not his manner or ap-
proach. His assessment reflects careful analysis of a deeply troubling 
reality. The reality is two-fold: a clear danger that is palpable and vis-
ceral and a commensurate failure to clearly recognize, much less artic-
ulate, the danger. One hopes the threat is recognized by the national 
security and intelligence community, but deliberately minimized by 
the political level. That, however, may represent a false hope; as trag-
ically demonstrated in the past, the much-vaunted domestic intelli-
gence community has failed to recognize concrete threats. The conse-
quences were disastrous. On November 4, 1995, Yigal Amir, a right-
wing religious nationalist motivated by extremist rabbis, assassinated 
Prime Minister Rabin.52 We will return to this in the pages ahead. 
The danger to society posed by right-wing extremists who merge 
nationalism and religion is real. Minimization is dangerous and futile. 
But minimizing the external threat is also fool’s gold. One threat does 
not come at the expense of the other; this is not a zero-sum game 
whereby it is one or the other. To suggest that is to simplify the threats 
and minimize the complexity of the situation. It is correct to debate 
the severity of distinct threats. Decision makers need to both prioritize 
the intensity and immediacy of each threat and the operational 
measures required to respond, much less mitigate, potential danger. It 
is impossible to view each threat equally and to prepare for each with 
equal resources. 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Meaning and Significance of the Rabin Assassination, 
ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Nov. 4, 2015), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/3917. 
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Prioritization and resource allocation are critical to effective na-
tional security decision making. Both require effective intelligence 
gathering and analysis predicated on acknowledging the viability of 
threats, regardless of their origin. This can pose a dilemma for decision 
makers who, for political interests, might instinctually minimize the 
severity of a particular threat resulting from electoral discomfort. 
From a strictly political perspective, such a dilemma is understandable. 
That is particularly the case for a right-wing government concerned 
about its political base. The question of political expediency, calcu-
lated as it may be, bumps up against concerns regarding public order 
and individual safety. Tolerance of intolerance and extremism can pose 
significant dangers to society at large and individuals in particular.53 
Examples are plentiful of political leaders who tolerate intolerance 
for naked political interests. Angering one’s base is politically expedi-
ent; it is, also, the height of irresponsibility. Deliberately minimizing 
an internal threat in a country like Israel is fraught with danger. Israel 
is a tinderbox of competing cultures, norms, and religions. The com-
plexity—much less multiplicity—of threats is Israel’s reality. So is the 
politicizing of and using of the threats. External threats are, as Bis-
marck wisely suggested, convenient distractions when internal threats 
pose significant problems. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is a mas-
ter practitioner of this principle.54 
Directing focus toward outside threats is politically understanda-
ble, and perhaps wise. However, it comes with a price: embolden-
ing extremist actors. That is not to suggest the intention is to encour-
age or facilitate violence, but it is to highlight the danger of failing to 
unequivocally condemn extremism and violence.55 This is a fine line in 
the militant-bystander democracy discussion: tolerating free speech 
is the essence of democracy, but tolerating intolerant speech that ad-
vocates hatred and violence is an extraordinary risk. There is a price 
 
 53. See AMOS N. GUIORA, TOLERATING INTOLERANCE: THE PRICE OF EXTREMISM 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2014). 
 54. As these lines are written, Netanyahu is under criminal investigation on a number of 
suspected offenses including bribery, corruption, and violating the public trust. The police—in 
accordance with Israeli law—will make their recommendations to the State Attorney in the 
months ahead regarding filing of indictments against the Prime Minister. Israeli law does not 
require Netanyahu to resign were the State Attorney to file indictments. 
 55. Ruth  Margalit,  Israel’s  Jewish-Terrorist  Problem,  NEW  YORKER  (Aug.  4,  2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/israels-jewish-terrorist-problem; Shmuel Rosner, 
Fighting Jewish Terrorism is the Burden of Israel’s Right, JEWISH J. (Aug. 3, 2015),   http://jew-
ishjournal.com/current_edition/176362/fighting-jewish-terrorism-is-the-burden-of-israels-righ 
t/. 
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for tolerating speech calling for “Death to Arabs”;56 the                           
tolerance reflects bystander democracy whereas banning it suggests                        
militant democracy. 
With respect to national leaders, are those who advocate tolerance 
of such speech practicing bystander democracy? Is their leadership a 
mix and match of militant and bystander democracy: militant with 
some threats, bystander with others? 
Re-articulated: is tolerance of racist speech in the name of political 
convenience to be perceived as bystander democracy? And, when the 
same politician is quick to condemn speech by Palestinian terrorists (or 
their supporters) calling for the murder of Jews, is this reflective of 
militant democracy? Or, is tolerating the first and condemning the sec-
ond to be understood as practicing militant and bystander                      
democracy simultaneously? 
The question is whether the threats posed by extremists impose 
the obligation on politicians to implement militant democracy on their 
base rather than engage in bystander democracy. Implementing mili-
tant democracy regarding Palestinian terrorism is, in many circum-
stances, legitimate and warranted. That is not to suggest all measures 
are necessary, but is to highlight the necessity of engaging in legitimate 
self-defense devoid of a political-diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Those who oppose application of militant democ-
racy measures in response to Palestinian terrorism are from the polit-
ical left and deeply opposed to Netanyahu. 
However, the validity of the political response to Palestinian ex-
tremism is not the question we are addressing. Rather, we are examin-
ing the consequences of bystander democracy applied to Jewish ex-
tremists whose supporters are the Prime Minister’s natural allies. That 
enables—perhaps justifies is a more apt word—terminology that can 
be interpreted as tolerating political violence initiated from their sup-
porters. We can but learn from history. To that end, we offer the fol-
lowing to set the scene. We do so for the purpose of enabling the con- 
 
 
 56. Nir Hasson, Right-Wing Protestors March in Jerusalem, Chant ‘Death to Arabs,’ 
HAARETZ (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-right-wing-protesters-in-j-lem-
chant-death-to-arabs-1.5406971; Stuart Winer & Jacob Magid, ‘Death to Arabs’ Graffitied on 
Cars in Palestinian Village, TIMES OF ISR. (Feb. 13, 2018) https://www.timesofisrael.com/death-
to-arabs-graffitied-on-cars-in-palestinian-village/; Israel Settlers Call for ‘Death to Arabs’ on Vi-
olent Spree, MIDDLE EASTERN MONITOR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.middleeastmoni-
tor.com/20180420-israel-settlers-call-for-death-to-arabs-on-violent-spree/. 
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versation that awaits us: when should political free speech be limited 
and when should political parties be banned? 
1.  The 1980’s Jewish Underground 
 In the early 1980s, 28 members of the Jewish Underground – a 
terror group that targeted Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusa-
lem – were arrested and given lengthy prison sentences. Yet within 
seven years of being jailed, they had all been released, returning to 
the limelight as either respected journalists, political activists and set-
tler leaders, or slipping under the radar to lead private lives.57 
The Jewish Underground—a term that is a matter of some contro-
versy—refers to a group of religious-nationalist Jews who committed a 
series of attacks on Palestinian residents of the West Bank. 58 When ar-
rested, and in their subsequent interrogations, members confessed to 
deliberately targeting senior Palestinian leaders who they considered 
posed a danger to Israel. In addition, members attacked an Islamic He-
brew school. Victims were randomly chosen, though the perpetrators 
agreed to refrain from attacking girls. The actions came in the after-
math of the murders of Israelis in the West Bank. The group believed 
their actions were justified as self-defense. A number of people were 
killed; in one instance an Israeli sapper was critically injured.59 
One member, Yehuda Etzion, planned on destroying the Dome of 
the Rock, a holy Moslem place of prayer located on Temple Mount in 
Jerusalem. Etzion believed the Dome of the Rock60 was an abomina-
tion that must be destroyed in order to ensure Jewish sovereignty. 
While Etzion and others gathered explosives, their actions did not 
go beyond that. But the members, who were caught by the General 
Security Services,61 claimed they had rabbinical permission to commit 
 
 57. Aimee Amiga, Israel Was Soft on Jewish Terrorists in the 1980s - Will History Repeat 
Itself?, HAARETZ (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.702702. 
 58. Donald Neff,  Jewish Terrorists Try to Assassinate Three Palestinian Mayors, WASH. 
REP. ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFS. (June, 1999), https://www.wrmea.org/1999-june/jewish-ter-
rorists-try-to-assassinate-three-palestinian-mayors.html; 3 Israeli Terrorists are Released in 4th 
Reduction of Their Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/27/ 
world/3-israeli-terrorists-are-released-in-4th-reduction-of-their-terms.html. 
 59. Neff, supra note 58; 3 Israeli Terrorists are Released in 4th Reduc-
tion of Their Terms, supra note 58. 
 60. Dome of the Rock, BIBLEPLACES, https://www.bibleplaces.com/domeofrock/ (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
 61. The General Security Services is known in Hebrew as SHABAK (Sherut bitachon 
leumi)—today the correct English translation is Israel Security Agency. 
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their acts. The harm the group caused, regardless whether the term is 
semantically and terminologically correct, was significant. And if the 
group had succeeded with carrying out their plan, the results would 
have been disastrous. 
Important for our purposes are two facets: (1) the deliberate mini-
mizing by political leadership of the groups’ actions and (2) the failure 
of the intelligence community to sufficiently understand the threat 
posed by Jewish extremists. The former reflects, in the context of mil-
itant-bystander democracy, bystander democracy for it suggests a con-
scious decision to understate a clear internal threat. The intelligence 
failure to recognize an internal threat would repeat itself on November 
4, 1995, when the Prime Minister was assassinated. 
The consequences of bystander democracy, as exemplified in the 
case of the Jewish Underground, are more than significant. The pri-
mary obligation of the nation-state is to protect innocent civilians and 
uphold the rule of law. While impossible to have a police officer at 
every corner, it is incumbent upon elected officials to unequivocally 
condemn acts of violence, regardless of their motivation and justifica-
tion. More than that, the obligation is to make a concerted effort to 
nip such actions in the bud. This is the difference between reaction 
and proactive action. Condemnation perceived as lip service is as 
harmful as failing to proactively prevent such action. 
In the aftermath of the murders and attacks undertaken by the Jew-
ish Underground, half-hearted condemnation, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, establishes a dangerous precedent whereby political-reli-
gious violence will be tolerated for purposes of political expediency. 
That is a form of bystander democracy. It fails to sufficiently protect 
vulnerable members of society and/or to aggressively respond to ef-
forts to undermine democratic institutions. The consequences are 
tragic, reflecting a profound failure of government agencies and illu-
minating the ramifications of creating a tolerating intolerance para-
digm. That is, bystander democracy allows the pushing of limits and 
endangers society from within. It is the antithesis of militant democ-
racy as articulated by Loewenstein. 
Planning such attacks is immeasurably easier when the actors as-
sess that government leaders will tolerate their intolerance either be-
cause of political expediency or ideological alliance. That is bystander 
democracy, for it enables or tolerates speech that results in actions that 
threaten the fabric of society. Speech is an important component of 
ideological predicated action. The Jewish Underground, much like 
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Rabin’s assassin, received guidance from rabbis whose teachings 
and interpretation of scripture were essential to the actions of the   
Jewish terrorists. 
The casualness with which the political leadership responded set a 
dangerous precedent of tolerating racism and violence. The victims are 
both Palestinians, deliberately and randomly targeted, and the govern-
ment, whose authority is undermined in the name of religious nation-
alism. In a country like Israel, where tensions, conflicts, and violence 
are an inherent part of the narrative, militant democracy is justified in 
the face of a direct challenge. The Jewish Underground posed such a 
challenge. To say it was responded to in full force would be             
an exaggeration. 
2.  Kach: The racist, banned political party 
On June 19, 1984, the Israel Central Elections Committee voted 
18-10 to ban Kach, a racist political party led by Rabbi Meir Kahane, 
from participating in the July Knesset elections.62 The Chairman of 
the Elections Commission, Justice Gavriel Bach, maintained that Kach 
undermined democracy. This was the first time in Israeli history that 
a Jewish political party would be banned from participating in an elec-
tion. In 1965, an Arab-Socialist political party had been banned, 
but the Supreme Court, nevertheless, overturned the Election Com-
mission decision.63 
In 1988, the Knesset revised the Knesset Election Law banning 
political parties that incite racism. In its aftermath, Kach was banned 
from participating in the 1988 election. A petition was filed before the 
Israel Supreme Court which upheld the ban.64 
In Kach v. Central Election Committee for the 12th Knesset,65 
President Meir Shamgar, writing for the Court, wrote the following: 
 The Appellant [Kach, ANG-KJI] wishes to deprive a portion of 
the citizens of the State, which it distinguishes by its national origin 
and ethnicity, of their right to vote, to be elected and to be appointed 
 
 62. Gil Sedan, Kahane Group Barred from July 23 Knesset Ballot; Ban First for Jewish 
List, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (June 19, 1984),  http://pdfs.jta.org/1984/1984-06-19_11 
5.pdf?_ga=2.189702891.1588708135.1538021256-1626397147.1538021255. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. EA 1/88 Kach v. Cent. Election Comm. for the 12th Knesset 7 Cheshvan 5749 (1988) 
(Isr.). 
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to government positions. Stripping such rights is a clear and unequiv-
ocal infringement upon the very soul of democracy, which is based 
on equal political rights among all citizens, irrespective of race, reli-
gion, nationality or gender. . . . 
 The Appellant’s objectives and conduct are also clearly racist: sys-
tematically fanning the flames of ethnic and national hate, which 
causes divisiveness and animosity; calling for the forceful deprivation 
of rights; systematic and intentional degradation directed towards a 
specific part of the population selected because of their national 
origin and ethnicity; [calling] for their humiliation in ways very sim-
ilar to the terrible experiences of the Jewish nation. All these reasons 
suffice, in light of the evidence presented, to come to this conclusion 
regarding incitement to racism. The extent of the actions taken by 
the Appellant in all its forms; the extremism through which it pre-
sents the action accompanying it; and the terrible distortion of the 
nature of the State and its regime that flow from it point to the se-
verity of its objectives and conduct that requires that we affirm the 
decision of the Central Election Committee.66 
The decision to ban Kahane’s party is the manifestation of militant 
democracy. The party was openly racist, espousing hatred of Israeli 
Arabs. There was to be no mistake regarding their agenda; supporters 
and opponents alike had no illusion regarding the party’s plat-
form.67 Kahane, an American-born rabbi, played to the extreme right-
wing of the Israeli electorate. Racism was the cornerstone of his appeal 
and platform. There was no hiding the ball. The party had a very clear 
vision of what Israel should look like and what ethnic group must 
be excluded. 
To suggest Kahane was irrational is to under-estimate his capabil-
ities and vision. Whether he believed in his ability to force Israeli 
Arab’s to leave their homes is an open question. What is undeniable is 
that he tapped into the dark side of Israeli society. His supporters, 
largely lower-middle class, Sephardic Jews, felt marginalized by main-
stream society (meaning Ashkenazi Jews, ANG-KJI) who were consid-
ered soft in the face of threats posed by Arabs. The politics and rhetoric 
were crude and base. Violence, whether verbal or physical, was very 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Carla Hall, The Message of Meir Kahane, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 1984), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1984/09/11/the-message-of-meir-kahane/95 
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much in the air. Kahane was a demagogue, a hate-monger, who en-
joyed momentary success. That cannot be denied. 
The decision to ban his party reflected deep concern regarding 
both his political philosophy and the threat that his philosophy posed 
to society. The former is understandable; the latter less so. The caveat, 
of course, is that hindsight is nothing more than 20/20 vision and what 
one sees in 2018 is not what one saw in the moment. That is an im-
portant component in the militant-bystander discussion. Protecting 
society in general and individuals in particular is the primary obligation 
of government. Nevertheless, care must be taken not to trammel rights 
of those who challenge, even if uncomfortably, traditional institutions 
and mores. A healthy, strong, and vibrant democracy can tolerate chal-
lenging voices. The question is when to draw the line and determine 
that a threat is viable. 
There is no doubt Kahane and his party were virulent racists. After 
all, their stated goal was to strive for an Arab-free Israel. This was the 
epitome of racism. The Supreme Court, in upholding their ban, noted 
their “objectives and conduct are also clearly racist: systematically fan-
ning the flames of ethnic and national hate, which causes divisiveness 
and animosity.”68 
However, while there are no grounds for disagreeing with Presi-
dent (Chief Justice) Shamgar’s analysis of Kahane’s objectives, the mil-
itant-bystander democracy debate requires balancing competing ten-
sions and interests. Mere repugnancy of a particular idea is 
not sufficient grounds for denying those who subscribe to a particular 
ideology the right to participate in the democratic process. It is a deci-
sion that must be made carefully, considering a significant number 
of considerations. 
Kahane clearly espoused anti-democratic beliefs—“calling for the 
forceful deprivation of rights”69 of a particular group. The question is 
whether Kahane’s platform was justifiably sufficient for the Supreme 
Court to uphold the Election Commission decision to ban him. While 
the Court ruled affirmatively, considering the consequences and im-
pact on the Kach supporter is no less important than the principles of 
tolerance and democratic values that were at the heart of the 
Court’s decision. 
 
 68. Neiman, 7 Cheshvan 5749. 
 69. Id. 
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3.  Assassination of Prime Minister Rabin 
On November 4, 1995, Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by 
a Jewish religious nationalist. The authorities said with certainty that 
the assassin, Yigal Amir, was incited by extremist rabbis.70 Neverthe-
less, the then Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair failed to prosecute 
the rabbis who incited Ben-Yair.71 The Attorney General’s decision 
was inexplicable then and it continues to defy reason two decades later. 
It represents, without a doubt, the Israeli government’s failure to pro-
tect the individual who was threatened on a regular basis. More than 
that, assassination of a Prime Minister because of deep opposition to 
his efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict undermines      
democratic principles. 
The state organs failed, chiefly the intelligence community prior 
to the assassination, and the Ministry of Justice in its aftermath. The 
intelligence community because they failed to assess and recognize 
clear warning signs; the Ministry of Justice because of a deliberate un-
willingness to directly confront inciting, extremist rabbis. The intelli-
gence community’s failure led to Rabin’s assassination; the Ministry of 
Justice’s failure undermined democracy. 
The writing was on the wall—something was going to happen. 
The verbal violence against the Prime Minster was palpable and unde-
niable.72 Ben-Yair and those in the Ministry of Justice who failed to 
forcibly investigate, interrogate, and prosecute those responsible for 
Rabin’s assassination are guilty of bystander democracy. There were 
two critical decisions that reflect application of the bystander-democ-
racy model. First, the government failed to recognize the unmitigated, 
violent, and threatening speech consistently and loudly directed at 
Rabin before the assassination, which included demonstrations in 
which participants labelled the Prime Minister traitor and held plac-
ards of Rabin in a SS uniform. And then, after the assassination, the 
government declined to prosecute the inciting rabbi’s after the assas-
sination. Both decisions reflect an extraordinary tolerance of free  
 
 
 70. Kremnitzer, supra note 52. 
 71. See AMOS GUIORA, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION: RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
(Oxford Univ. Press,  2d ed. 2014). 
  72. Walter Rodgers, Anti-Rabin Sentiment Had Turned Ugly: Confessed Assassin Had 
Been Seen Before, CNN (Nov. 5, 1995), http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/rabin/why_now/ 
index.html. 
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speech; they suggest that overwhelming priority and preference is 
given to the speaker and the speech at the expense of a specific target. 
This is to be distinguished from the decision to ban Kach. Without 
a doubt, the party espoused racist elements directed at a particular eth-
nic group—Israeli Arabs—but did not focus on a specific individual. 
The violence, verbal and ultimately physical, directed at Rabin harkens 
back to the Jewish Underground in that both were motivated by          
inciting rabbis. 
The similarities are essential to our understanding of the applica-
tion of bystander democracy: the tolerance of incitement and the un-
willingness to directly confront those responsible for creating a hate-
filled atmosphere, imbued with violence and clear, unmistakable calls 
to harm. Yet decision makers chose to turn a blind eye in accordance 
with the principles of what we define as bystander democracy. That is 
in direct contrast to how the Elections Commission in 1984 and 1988 
and the Supreme Court in 1988 viewed the question of Kach’s partic-
ipation in elections to the Knesset. 
While the Supreme Court in 1984 ruled in favor of Kach’s partic-
ipation, that is more a reflection of the Court’s interpretation of rele-
vant legislation than an affirmation or tolerance of the party’s explicit 
racist views. President (Chief Justice) Shamgar’s opinion in 1988 
makes very clear how the Court viewed Kach; in the context of mili-
tant-bystander democracy, the Court (1988) and Election Commission 
(1984 and 1988) clearly sided with militant democracy as articulated 
by Professor Loewenstein. 
4.  Final word 
Adoption of bystander democracy, in direct contrast to militant 
democracy, created an environment whereby incitement was enabled 
and horrific violence resulted. This is the consequence of failing to di-
rectly curtail extremism. It should serve as a sobering lesson when con-
sidering the consequences of failing to protect both democratic insti-
tutions and vulnerable members of society. This goes to the heart of 
the limits of free speech and banning political party discussion, and 
requires resolving how to protect democracy and the consequences of 
failing to protect its values. 
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B.  Germany 
To understand Germany requires examining its history. It is, need-
less to say, marked by extraordinary achievements and accomplish-
ments alongside responsibility for the Holocaust. The dissonance be-
tween the two—some of the greatest artists, thinkers, writers, and 
philosophers side by side with Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich and Eich-
mann—has been widely discussed and analyzed. The continued rele-
vance of this issue was brought into sharp focus when Alexander Gau-
land, a leader of the right-wing Alternative for Germany party said: 
“Hitler and the Nazis are just birdshit in more than 1,000 years of suc-
cessful German history.”73 A response was quick in coming from An-
negret Kramp-Karrenbaue, the Secretary General of Chancellor An-
gela Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Party: “Fifty million 
victims of war, the Holocaust and all-out war are for the AfD and Gau-
land just ‘bird shit.’ This is what the party looks like behind its 
civic mask.”74 
While we have no intention to engage in a broad discussion about 
the Holocaust, addressing militant-bystander democracy in Germany 
today requires an understanding of the events of 1933-1945. Other-
wise, it is impossible to understand contemporary Germany. In the 
context of the militant-bystander democracy paradigm, how Germany 
resolves contemporary tensions and challenges is directly impacted by 
how it failed to protect its democratic institutions when challenged 
from within. 
The dark days of National Socialism did not happen in a vacuum; 
the Nazi’s did not fall upon Germany out of nowhere. Quite the op-
posite. Defeat in World War I, reparations imposed by the Treaty of 
Versailles, collapse of the Weimar Republic, and economic distress 
were in retrospect, harbingers of Hitler’s rise to power through dem-
ocratic means and the unimaginable consequences it wrought. 
Emphasizing that Hitler came to power democratically is relevant 
to the militant-bystander democracy discussion. Recall that Professor 
Loewenstein’s words, discussed at length above, were written during 
 
 73. Simone Rothe, Far-Right Party Leader’s Nazi Comments Blasted by German Politi-
cians, DPA-INT’L (June 2, 2018), http://www.dpa-international.com/topic/far-right-party-
leader-nazi-comments-blasted-german-180602-99-558244. 
 74. Daniel Politi, Far-Right German Leader Dismisses Nazi Era as “Speck of Bird Poop” 
in Country’s History, SLATE (June 2, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/far-
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that dark era. They remind us of the reality—and consequences—of 
democracy failing to protect itself. The rise to power of National So-
cialism is the result of a failure of the German democracy to protect 
itself—a profound mistake and miscalculation. In many ways, it is the 
example, the standard by which all other nefarious uses, or more accu-
rately misuses, of the weakness of democracy is measured. 
Commenting on the Nazi rise to power Joseph Goebbels boasted: 
 We enter parliament in order to supply ourselves, in the arsenal 
of democracy, with its own weapons. . . If democracy is so stupid as 
to give us free tickets and salaries for this bear’s work, that is its af-
fair. . . We do not come as friends, nor even as neutrals. We come as 
enemies. As the wolf bursts into the flock, so we come.75 
Goebbels statement rings unfortunately true: pre-World War II 
German democracy was, indeed, unable to protect itself and became 
an unwitting weapon in the hands of the Nazis. The question is 
whether democratic institutions protect themselves when under attack 
from within or, quoting Goebbels, whether democracy is “so stupid as 
to give us free tickets.”76 The discussion, however, is more nuanced 
than that. It is not enough to protect—that is too easy and insuffi-
ciently narrow. The more difficult question is against whom to protect 
and the limits of that protection. 
While it is tempting to suggest one primary cause for tumultuous 
events, history suggests a more nuanced and sophisticated approach is 
appropriate. The temptation to ascribe the rise to one event minimizes 
the complexity of how democracy protects—or fails to protect—itself 
in the face of innumerable challenges, failures, dilemmas, and crises.  
That Germany was in crisis after World War I is unquestionable. 
That German leadership failed to protect German democracy—no 
matter how unstable, troubled, and vulnerable—is similarly not in 
doubt. If there was ever a time for militant democracy to be practiced, 
this was the time. The inability to do so, and the failure to recognize 
an internal threat, had devastating consequences. Professor Loewen-
stein’s words were, in retrospect, remarkably prophetic. 
 
 75. Joseph Goebbels, German Nazi Propagandist in 1928, in THE CONCISE COLUMBIA 
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 107 (Robert Andrews ed., 1989). 
 76. Id. 
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Daniel Goldhagen argues in his book, Hitler’s Willing Execution-
ers,77 that the Holocaust is a reflection of historic German anti-Semi-
tisim, suggesting an inevitability to the Holocaust. Goldhagen’s theory 
has been praised by some and criticized by others. What is clear, re-
gardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Goldhagen, is that 
Germany has a virulent anti-Semitism pock-marked history. That, 
however, does not suggest the destruction of European Jewry was the 
preordained result of historic anti-Semitism. After all, much of Euro-
pean history is characterized by anti-Semitism, whether emanating 
from the Catholic Church or from national leaders. What is clear, in 
retrospect, is the vulnerability of Europe’s Jews, their presumed          
assimilation notwithstanding. 
Amos Elon’s prize-winning book, The Pity of It All,78 makes very 
clear that while German Jews considered themselves Germans, Ger-
mans considered German Jews to be Jewish, not German. The differ-
ence is crucial in understanding the relationship between Germany 
and its Jews. The difference is neither semantic nor terminological. It 
is profound for it reflects a deep misunderstanding of the relationship 
between a particular ethnic group and larger society. As Elon makes 
clear, German Jews had literally convinced themselves they were full 
members of society. 
Pre-National Socialism instances of anti-Semitism were explained 
away or minimized. It was a defense mechanism. While perhaps un-
derstandable, its consequences were horrific. The refusal to recognize 
the painful reality that society did not fully accept you, but rather that 
you were an outsider—best efforts notwithstanding—is important in 
the militant democracy discussion. 
1.  Neo-Nazism and Jihadism in Germany today 
As to Germany today: in the summer of 2017, one of the authors79 
spent a week meeting with senior security and government officials, 
scholars, and members of civil society. The officials represented both 
federal and state agencies and institutions. 
 
 77. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1st Vintage Books, 1996). 
 78. AMOS ELON, THE PITY OF IT ALL: A HISTORY OF JEWS IN GERMANY, 1743–1933 
(2002). 
   79. Professor Guiora travelled to Germany and the Netherlands during the summer of 
2017 to conduct interviews for this article and other academic projects. 
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The meetings, focusing on issues relevant to this writing pro-
ject, were conducted in a variety of locations. All interlocutors shared 
concerns regarding significant challenges confronting contemporary 
German society. There was an understandable lack of uniformity re-
garding both concerns and solutions. Some conversations were partic-
ularly sobering especially regarding the rise in anti-Semitism in Ger-
many today. This was a theme that repeated itself, whether the 
discussion focused on the extreme right-wing or on immigrant com-
munities and the government’s failure or unwillingness to directly ad-
dress this troubling development. There was a two-fold concern: one, 
the rise of anti-Semitism and two, government inaction. 
While there was not a sense of a country in crisis, there was a trou-
bling disquiet that marked the discussions. No interlocutor offered a 
particularly rosy assessment of the state of the nation. However, it 
would be an exaggeration to suggest fear was expressed, explicitly or 
implicitly. Perhaps the best term is anxiety, bordering on deep anxiety. 
The conversations were candid, thoughtful, and revealing. They sug-
gested a society facing two distinct, yet simultaneous, internal threats: 
Neo-Nazism and Jihadism. Clearly conveyed was the sense that Ger-
man political leaders, civil society, courts, and the public are facing a 
very busy national agenda. 
Germany’s troubled history underlined each conversation. It is to 
state the obvious that the Holocaust and its causes and lessons were a 
constant. There was a sense that discussing the challenges facing Ger-
many today must be viewed through the lens of history. It was a con-
sistent sub-text, a pervasive constant that could not be ignored. 
Whether that reflected the topic at hand—threats German democracy 
faces and how to respond—or is, seventy-five years later, still an issue 
that invariably weaves itself into such conversations was unclear. Re-
gardless of the impetus, in discussing both threats, the Holocaust had 
a prominent seat at the table. 
The discussions were held before the September 2017 election 
which resulted in the electoral success of the Alternative for Germany 
Party in the Bundestag, making it the third largest party. Conversa-
tions suggested this electoral success was to be expected and were it to 
come to fruition, which it did, it would be disingenuous to claim sur-
prise. That was the source of some consternation, reflective of a senti-
ment best described as “didn’t we learn anything from history.” 
The cause for this prediction, which was accurate in retrospect, 
was attributed to two issues: the rise of immigration to Germany and 
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an increase in anti-Semitism. The immigration, primarily, albeit not 
exclusively, from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, was believed to under-
mine German society, both economically and socially.80 The former, 
because of the belief that immigrants take jobs from traditional Ger-
mans, and the latter, because of the belief that immigrants undermine 
traditional society and call into question the stability that has marked 
Germany in previous decades. 
Concern regarding immigration focused on the inability of immi-
grants to adapt to German society. The example repeatedly mentioned 
was the verbal and sometimes physical harassment that white German 
women were subjected to by immigrant men.81 A number of examples 
were repeatedly emphasized— most of which had been covered 
broadly by the media. These instances, doubtlessly humiliating and 
greatly unpleasant for the affected women, were offered as proof of the 
immigrants’ inability to understand the norms and mores of             
western culture. 
The argument proposed was that immigrants threatened German 
society. In other words, the outsider had failed to understand his new 
home. This was a theme the political right used to its electoral ad-
vantage. It is, as discussed above, not the first time German society has 
looked disparagingly at the outsider. There is a critical difference: Jews 
had lived in Germany for hundreds of years, whereas Muslim immi-
grants were relative newcomers. 
Nevertheless, the extreme right has lumped the two groups into 
one basket in spite of their obvious differences. The situation, how-
ever, is more complex than that. As a number of interlocutors sug-
gested, there is a link and arguably an alliance between the extreme 
right and Muslims. Perhaps this is in accordance with the adage the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend. Otherwise, one is hard-pressed to 
understand this seemingly strange union of what would otherwise be 
perceived as unnatural bedfellows. 
An accounting of the severity of each threat—neo-Nazi’s and im-
migration—depends on who you ask. There was, perhaps not surpris-
ingly, a lack of unanimity regarding which threat posed a greater dan-
ger to society. Arguably, the differences in perspective depends on 
one’s particular perch. Security officials were focused on the extreme 
 
 80. Guiora, Germany Must Confront Its New Wave of Anti-Semitism, supra note 7; 
Guiora, Wannsee Villa, supra note 7; Liphshiz, supra note 7. 
 81. Anna Sauerbrey, The German Feminists’ Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12/opinion/the-german-feminists-dilemma.html. 
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right, particularly on the trial of Beate Zschaepe. Zschaepe, whose trial 
concluded in July 2018, was convicted of murdering eight Turks, a 
Greek citizen, and a policewoman in a racially-motivated series of 
murders.82 As a member of the National Socialist Underground 
(NSU), Zschaepe, along with Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Boehnhardt, was 
convicted of carrying out a bombing attack and multiple robberies be-
tween 2000 and 2007 that resulted in the deaths of the ten victims.83 
While Zschaepe’s accomplices, who died in an apparent murder 
suicide, were never brought to justice, the murders did expose “serious 
shortcomings in the German state’s monitoring of neo-Nazis, and led 
to a public inquiry into how police failed to discover the murder 
plot.”84 The group had evaded law enforcement for eleven years before 
Zschaepe turned herself in to German authorities.85 Although 
Zschaepe’s attorneys made a statement denying her physical presence 
during the underlying bombing and robberies, Zschaepe will face a life 
sentence for her involvement in the NSU. Zschaepe was sentenced 
along with others involved with NSU and when a co-defendant was 
given a “lower sentence than expected,” far-right attendees clapped in 
the courtroom.86 
2.  Final word 
The rise of the far right in recent German history is indeed dis-
turbing. The fact that there remains support for neo-Nazis reflects the 
seriousness of the circumstances. And, while law enforcement has 
taken steps to address this threat,87 largely in response to the public 
outcry following the NSU murder investigation, there is justifiable 
concern that the problem will persist. 
 
 
 82. Beate Zschäpe Given Life in German Neo-Nazi Murder Trial, BBC NEWS (July 11, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44764827. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. German Court Sentences Woman to Life for Neo-Nazi Murders, CBS NEWS 
(July  11,  2018),  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/german-neo-nazi-beate-zschaepe-guilty-life-
sentence-murder-of-migrants/. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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C.  The Netherlands 
Like Israel and Germany, Dutch political extremism is unique to 
its history and culture. Most recently, the tension between the larger 
Netherlands population and the population of immigrants from Mo-
rocco has manifested in extremism from both groups. Relevant to our 
discussion, the far-right has reacted with extreme rhetoric against the 
minority population. Justifying their actions and statements as a reac-
tion to Islamic extremism among portions of the Moroccan popula-
tion, the far-right has stirred serious support. The threat is not simply 
the dangerous racism at the core of this extremism, but rather the sup-
port for it in political leadership. 
1.  Prosecuting Geert Wilders 
At the center of far-right extremism in the Netherlands is MP 
Geert Wilders. Wilders acts as a voice for the right and the far-right 
and his statements have received international attention. Wilders’s 
rhetoric also serves as an example of not only the dangers of far-right 
extremism, but also the exercise of militant democratic principles.88 
The decision to prosecute Member of Parliament Geert Wilders 
under Dutch Penal Code 137 raises classic free speech questions and 
dilemmas, particularly regarding the limits of tolerance. Resolution of 
this dilemma requires balancing equally legitimate, viable, and valid 
considerations, principles, and interests.89 At its core, the prosecutorial 
decision goes to the essence of what is free speech and what limits can 
be imposed on that right. The decision to prosecute Wilders also raises 
important questions relevant to the tolerance/intolerance debate that 
can be divided into two distinct questions: (1) how much intolerance 
should be tolerated; and (2) who is tolerant/intolerant? 
The question is whether Wilders’s comments on March 12 and 19, 
2014 were deliberately offensive, deliberately incited to hate, and/or 
deliberately intended to discriminate against Moroccans. In assessing 
the comments, it is essential to focus and resolve if the words were 
deliberately offensive, discriminatory, or inciting to hatred. While 
 
 88. In the name of full disclosure, one of the authors (Guiora) was invited by Wilder’s 
defense to be an expert witness regarding the limits of free speech. In accordance with Dutch 
Criminal Law, the Court has the discretion whether to accede to such a request. The Court 
declined the request. 
 89. Art.137, SR (NETH.). An English translation can be found at http://www.ejtn.eu/Pag 
eFiles/6533/2014%20seminars/Omsenie/WetboekvanStrafrecht_ENG_PV.pdf. 
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there is no doubt Wilders said what he meant regarding Moroccans, 
that does not automatically equate meeting the deliberate standard in 
accordance with Section 137c and Section 137d.90 
Wilders engaged in an interactive “give and take/question and an-
swer” dialogue with his audience. It is clear from repeated viewing of 
the speech that speaker and audience alike knew the questions/an-
swers. The interaction is predicated on asking questions whose answers 
were known to both audience and speaker. However, that does not 
prima facie mean Wilders deliberately intended to offend, incite, 
and discriminate. 
The context and content are of equal importance in assessing 
whether the deliberate standard has been met. Both must be taken into 
consideration. As noted below, Wilders was speaking at a political fo-
rum to his audience articulating a worldview with which he is             
universally identified.  
2.  Wilders’s speeches 
In pursuing charges against Wilders, the prosecutor focused on 
Wilders’s public statements in which he asks his audience whether they 
want more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands.91 The comments 
accurately reflect Wilders’s long-standing political position, as            
articulated in the Party for Freedom (PVV)92 platform and in                
innumerable public speeches, in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Care-
ful review and thorough research of mainstream media, blogs, and 
other relevant information sources highlight the consistency of       
Wilders’s public positions.93 
 
 90. See Id. 
 91. The question whether the audience wanted more or fewer Moroccans in the Nether-
lands, is the third of three questions Wilders posed to his audience. The first two questions are 
unrelated to Moroccans and Islam. Dutch Muslims filed six-thousand public complaints with the 
public prosecutor in response to the comments. 
 92. Reiss Smith, Dutch Election 2017: What Parties Are Running Against Geert Wilders? 
VVD, PVV and More, EXPRESS (Mar. 16, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.express.co.uk/news/ 
world/779524/Dutch-election-2017-Parties-candidates-Geert-Wilders-VVD-PVV-Mark-Rutt 
e-CDA-PvdA. 
 93. Flavia Dzodan, Be Afraid: Geert Wilders Released His Platform for Next Year’s Elec-
tion, MEDIUM (Aug. 26, 2016), https://medium.com/@flaviadzodan/be-afraid-geert-wilders-re-
leased-his-platform-for-next-years-election-a1ac453a0fff; Stefanie Marsh, This Is Exactly What 
He Wants’: How Geert Wilders Won by Losing, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/geert-wilders-won-by-losing-netherlands-vote/51983 
4/; Sarah Wildman, Geert Wilders, The Islamophobe Some Call the Dutch Donald Drumpf, Ex-
plained, VOX (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/14/14921614/geert-wilders- 
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Wilders’s two speeches do not reflect or espouse new positions, 
perspectives, or platforms. There was, then, nothing new, different, or 
original in his comments. A cursory Internet search unequivocally con-
firms that. In addition to the questions regarding Moroccans, Wilders 
posed the same more-fewer question. Those questions, however, are 
not the subject of criminal prosecution. Wilders has not retracted his 
comments; his defense reflects a classic articulation of free speech, in 
spirit and practice alike. The context of the engagement with the au-
dience causes discomfort; the setting of a beer hall has been negatively 
noted both by defenders and critics alike. Critics focus on content and 
context reflecting a broader interpretation of speech extending beyond 
merely the spoken. While political talks occur in a wide range of set-
tings, it is important to note that the setting was, in our opinion, un-
fortunate, particularly from a historical perspective. 
There is, as noted by some of Wilders’s supporters, a discomfort 
factor with respect to content and context of his speech. Some have 
expressed regret for the exact circumstances of the statements, but no 
one is surprised that they were made. Regret is likely the result of the 
publicity and prosecution. The lack of surprise that Wilders made 
these comments can be attributed to the fact that Wilders’s comments 
accurately reflect his very public and recognized positions regarding 
immigration, emigration, and Moroccans.94 
There is an obvious similarity between Wilders’s focus on Moroc-
cans and the specific identification of European Jewry as the enemy by 
Nazi Germany. The argument has been proposed that National So-
cialist anti-Semitism is akin to Wilders’s stated position regarding 
harm Moroccans pose to the Netherlands.95 Similarly, the response of 
Wilders’s supporters would recall, for some, the anti-Arab incitement 
of the late Meir Kahane whose political party Kach was banned from 
participating in elections by the Israel Supreme Court.96 
 
islamophobia-islam-netherlands-populism-europe. 
 94. Christopher Caldwell, More or Less?, WKLY. STANDARD (Apr. 21, 2014), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/christopher-caldwell/more-or-less; Uri Friedman, Should 
Calling for ‘Fewer Morrocans’ Be Considered Hate Speech?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/geert-wilders-free-hate-speech/506 
018/; Janene Pieters, Wilders Hate Speech Appeal: ‘Fewer Moroccans’ a Call for Policy Change, 
Says Lawyer, NL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://nltimes.nl/2017/10/24/wilders-hate-speech-ap-
peal-fewer-moroccans-call-policy-change-says-lawyer. 
  95. See Dutch Far-Right Firebrand Geert Wilders Fails to Draw Large Crowd at Pergida 
Rally,  GUARDIAN  (Apr.  13,  2015),  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/13/geert-
wilders-pegida-germany-dutch-far-right. 
  96.  See supra sec. IV.A.2. 
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In addition, the singling out of a specific group, while particularly 
prominent in the Netherlands because of Wilders’s speeches and po-
litical platform, occurs elsewhere in Europe and the United States. To 
that end, it is a familiar refrain albeit with different chords, styles, sym-
bols, and mannerisms. 
In the context of identifying a particular group, whether ethnic, 
religious, or national, Wilders’s comments are problematic. The ques-
tion is whether they violate the Dutch Penal Code. Problematic speech 
that makes an audience uncomfortable is not a crime. Society is 
strengthened when challenged. Pushing the boundaries is an accepted 
component of vibrant, thriving democracies that value the exercise of 
freedoms and rights. 
Needless to say, those rights are not limitless. Protection of society 
and individuals alike is integral to public order and communal welfare. 
However, an unwarranted limit on free speech is equally dangerous; 
alternative voices are the essence of democracy. This is the essence of 
the balancing dilemma, if not the burden. Different countries have dis-
tinct approaches to the limits of the freedom of speech; line drawing is 
challenging, complex, and inherently controversial. 
3.  Balancing and tolerance-intolerance 
Prosecutors and courts are hard-pressed to consistently, much less 
coherently, articulate boundaries and criteria. Social media signifi-
cantly exacerbates the tension and difficulty; the range and immediacy 
of dissemination dramatically highlight the power of speech. That 
power is heightened when particular speech addresses an issue front 
and center in the public debate, taut with emotion and controversy, 
potentially volatile if not violent. 
Determining whether the speech was deliberately offensive, delib-
erately incited to hate, and/or deliberately intended to discriminate 
against Moroccans requires balancing the speaker’s right to exercise 
the right to free speech, the impact of the words, and resolving the 
tolerance-intolerance dilemma. While Wilders—undeniably—spoke 
the words, it is not clear they were intended to deliberately offend, 
incite, or discriminate. 
The words, while problematic and controversial, reflect the polit-
ical platform of a democratically elected Member of the Dutch Parlia-
ment. Though the words were spoken outside of Parliament and 
therefore do not enjoy parliamentary immunity, they are an accurate 
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reflection of a long-standing and frequently articulated political posi-
tion. There is nothing new in either their content or message. Wil-
ders’s words are not significantly distinct from those spoken through-
out Europe today. Whether that is a negative or a positive is irrelevant. 
What is relevant is that this is the reality. 
As to the intended audience, the give and take was with PVV sup-
porters at a political rally in the context of a campaign. Those support-
ers were the direct, intended audience, while the indirect audience in-
cluded those watching on TV, following on the Internet, and reading 
the newspaper. 
Without a doubt, the indirect audience included one of the targets 
of Wilders’s speech: Dutch Moroccans. From an analysis of the set-
ting/context and content, it would be an exaggeration to posit that 
Dutch Moroccans were the sole-exclusive intended audience. How-
ever, it is reasonable to surmise they understood the words were 
also directed at them. To assume they were the only audience would 
be incorrect. 
The tolerance-intolerance debate is essential to this analysis. In 
many ways, it is the core of the broader discussion in Europe today. 
Arguably, the issues Wilders raised dominate the public sphere from 
the UK to Germany, from Sweden to Spain, and from Norway to Italy. 
The news is dominated by reports of European “jihadists” travelling 
to Syria and Iraq to join forces with ISIS; there are regular media re-
ports regarding honor killings amongst Muslim communities in Eu-
rope; and rejection of traditional, enlightened European values is en-
couraged by imams in Europe who are public employees. 
These three examples are but the “tip of the iceberg” regarding 
intolerance, as articulated by certain segments of Europe’s Muslim 
population. In the main, those comments and actions go unpunished 
by European authorities. The reasons are varied, but the failure to ag-
gressively prosecute illegal conduct is suggestive of a willful decision 
to tolerate intolerance. Elected officials do not specifically articulate 
that tolerating intolerance is a policy; nevertheless, that approach 
largely defines Western European governments today. 
Repeated engagements with decision-makers in the Netherlands 
and the UK regarding this question have been more frustrating than 
satisfying, and more confounding than enlightening. The failure to 
prosecute intolerance reflects an understanding of the cost intolerance 
exacts on vulnerable members of society. This failure to prosecute in-
tolerance has directly result in harm to vulnerable members of society, 
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such as those who live in closed communities and those deemed to have 
offended particular tenets of a faith. Attacks on cartoonists, writers, 
artists, social commentators, and women manifest the tragic human 
price of tolerating intolerance. 
The failure to aggressively prosecute religious leaders who incite 
is troubling. The decision to prosecute Wilders on the charge of incit-
ing to hatred is suggestive of a double standard. While prosecutorial 
discretion is an accepted principle, the decision to impact Wilders’s 
right to free speech raises legitimate questions, if not concerns, regard-
ing a rigorous and consistent application of the balancing requirement 
inherent to free speech analysis. 
Similarly, the failure to equitably address, much less resolve, the 
tolerance-intolerance paradigm suggests four important observations: 
(1) unjustified tolerance of violence; (2) possible over-reach regarding 
limits on speech whose content was known and oft-repeated; (3) pro-
tection of violence (in the name of tolerating intolerance); and (4) pros-
ecution of speech that has not resulted in physical harm to the group 
believed to have been deliberately offended. 
4.  Application of the charge 
The question is, in applying a continuum model, what aspect of 
Section 137c and 137d97 do Wilders’s words violate. We must ask if 
the words: (1) deliberately offended; and/or (2) deliberately incited to 
hatred; and/or (3) deliberately discriminated? The analysis focuses on 
both content and context. 
Targeting a specific group can be understood as offensive to that 
group. However, given that Wilders was not in a position of power—
PVV is not in the ruling coalition and Wilders holds no governmental 
post—it is less clear whether the speech deliberately incited. With re-
spect to deliberately discriminate, it is difficult to understand how that 
charge can be argued given that Wilders is not in a position to, for 
instance, determine hiring/firing practices in the Netherlands. 
Of the three charges, incitement to hate seems the most problem-
atic and murkiest. It is a stretch to suggest that Wilders’s comments 
were intended to incite to hatred against Moroccans. While the audi-
ence and Wilders are engaged in a give and take, the context—a polit-
ical rally at a beer hall—is reflective of a campaign environment and 
 
 97. Art.137, supra note 89. 
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not more than that. It is hard to believe that individuals—upon leaving 
the campaign rally—intended to cause harm to Moroccans based on 
the interactive engagement with Wilders. There is nothing to suggest 
that incitement was his intent nor that someone could argue that his 
words propelled them to action. 
Whether the speech was offensive requires analyzing who was pre-
sent and who was the intended audience. Those present at the rally 
were Wilders’s supporters; they, it is safe to assume, were not offended. 
As to Moroccans who either heard of the rally or saw clips on the news 
or social media, a legitimate argument can be made that the give and 
take would be, clearly, unpleasant to the ear. There is, however, a dif-
ference between offensive speech and unpleasant speech. The former 
offends an individual or group whereas the latter is distasteful to 
the ear. 
While Wilders’s words were, perhaps, best not said and particu-
larly not in a beer hall, they were arguably neither inciting nor offen-
sive. They pushed the boundaries of civility regarding free speech but 
did not cross the line. 
5.  Final word 
Much like Israel and Germany, the Netherlands faces an ongoing 
and serious threat from the far right. As the prosecution and trial of 
Geert Wilders reflects, the Netherlands is also struggling to find the 
appropriate means of addressing far-right extremism while balancing 
its response to real concerns about jihadists. 
sK==obplisfkd=qeb=qbkpflk=_bqtbbk=jfifq^kq=^ka=
_vpq^kabo=abjl`o^`v=
It is apparent that every democracy bears both militant and by-
stander principles. Some democracies, like Israel and Germany, struc-
ture their legal and political system such that they err on the side of 
militancy. Others, like the Netherlands, err on the side of political lib-
erty. Regardless of which side of the fence a democracy sits, there are 
costs. The determination that every democracy must make is whether 
the cost of failing to prevent extremism is tolerable or whether toler-
ating extremism is less a burden than directly addressing it through the 
legal and political system. This determination requires, in part, a cost-
benefit analysis addressing the cost of tolerating intolerance that has 
the potential to destroy democracy from within. An analysis of that 
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cost requires understanding the possible consequences of turning a 
blind eye to the very danger of undermining democracy from within. 
The rise of the Nazi Party through legitimate means illustrates the 
immeasurable dangers of a bystander democracy. Extremist parties are 
not dangerous simply because they are successful. Their threat is legit-
imate because of their potential for immense destruction of both the 
democratic system of government and the people it governs. 
An extraordinary, thoughtful, and measured but also alarming 
speech, given by the President (Chief Justice, Retired) of the Israel Su-
preme Court, Dorit Beinisch, compellingly highlights dangers a de-
mocracy can face from within. Beinisch’s words must be understood in 
their contemporary context. Her speech, given in December 2017, 
comes at a particularly tumultuous time for Israeli democracy. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu, under intensive and consistent police 
investigations for alleged bribery and corruption charges, instructed 
his political supporters and operatives to weaken the powers of the Is-
rael Police.98 In the same spirit, Netanyahu and his ruling coalition 
members—amongst them the Minister of Justice, Ayelet Shaked—
have consistently sought to cast aspersions at the Israeli judiciary, par-
ticularly the Supreme Court.99 
Beinisch’s speech must be understood to be a warning that baseless 
undermining of democratic institutions undermine democracy itself. 
In other words, we live in uncertain times when, in the name of polit-
ical survival, politicians are willing to sacrifice, or at least minimize, the 
rule of law. In the context of militant-bystander democracy, it is essen-
tial to recall that the primary threat to democracy and democratic in-
stitutions comes from within. 
What Beinisch’s speech highlights is that threats can not only 
come from internal groups, whether right wing extremists or religious 
extremists, but from the executive branch that seeks, deliberately, to 
minimize the judiciary. She said: 
 
 
 98. Moran Azulay & Shahar Hay, Herzog: Netanyahu’s Attacks on Judiciary a ‘Clear and 
Present Danger to Democracy,’ YNETNEWS (May 1, 2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/arti-
cles/0,7340,L-5247664,00.html. 
 99. See Revital Hovel, Israel’s Chief Justice Warns Government in Landmark Speech: 
Judicial Branch ‘Under Unprecedented Attack,’ HAARETZ (July 5, 2018), https://www.haaretz.c 
om/israel-news/israel-s-chief-justice-judicial-branch-under-attack-1.6062718; Mordechai Krem 
nitzer, Israel’s War on Democracy Is Here–and the Justice Minister Is Leading the Charge, 
HAARETZ (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-s-war-on-the-
high-court-is-here-justice-minister-at-its-helm-1.6344247. 
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 I would like to share with you the great concern I feel these days 
for the continued existence of the basic values of Israeli democracy, 
for the status of law and the rule of law, and for the structure of the 
regime established here. 
 The institutional division of government authorities, the role of 
the courts and the role of the Supreme Court are experiencing a con-
tinuous process aimed at undermining their status, inspired by gov-
ernment policy. 
 The value of mamlachtiyut (loyalty and respect for the state insti-
tutions), which David Ben-Gurion attributed so much importance to, 
and the efforts invested in the abolition of partisanship and divisions 
in the army, in education and the internalizing of subordination to 
the rule of law - are all at risk. A magnificent legal system was estab-
lished here, on the foundation of respect for state institutions and on 
the foundations of a value-based philosophy, one that is independent, 
Jewish and liberal. All this happened in the difficult conditions of the 
early days of the state, and when society in Israel was divided and not 
yet formed into one people. We have since come a long way in many 
fields and can boast many achievements. It seems that we are cur-
rently in the midst of a process that might erode these achievements, 
because it is intended to weaken the institutions of the law. . . . The 
significance of this trend is an attack on the envelope whose function 
is to protect the democratic system of government and human rights, 
and to allow the executive branch – the government – to wield power 
without judicial review and legal guidance, under the auspices of the 
legislative branch - the Knesset. 
 Under the misguided slogan of governability, which is replacing 
the mamlachtiyut approach, we are witnessing the strengthening of 
the tendency to intentionally shrink the powers and functions that 
are distinctly the functions of the judicial system. In order to achieve 
this objective, misleading information is disseminated regarding the 
Court, the judges, and the judicial proceedings. 
 New bills, some of which are designed to solve personal and con-
crete problems, instead of taking into account the public interest in a 
broad sense, might jeopardize, in the long run, the war on corruption 
and the obligation of all agencies to act only within the framework of 
the law.100 
 
 100. Dorit Beinisch, retired President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Without the Rule of 
Law, Israel’s Existence Is in Danger, (Nov. 30, 2017) (original Hebrew transcript available at 
https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5050287,00.html  (last  accessed  Sept.  13,  2018)) 
(translated above by Ori Nir). 
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While politicians often shift the blame when they come under at-
tack, a deliberate minimization and delegitimization of a democracy’s 
judiciary is a more dangerous tactic. The more a judiciary’s legitimacy 
is questioned; the more tenuous democracy becomes. A fair and im-
partial judiciary, beholden to no power greater than its own authority 
and the nation’s laws,101 is the bedrock of democracy. 
The judiciary insures protection of rights, freedoms, and privi-
leges. Similarly, it guarantees that those who violate the laws, regard-
less of status and station, will be dealt with accordingly and if necessary, 
suffer the consequences of their actions. To minimize this for the sake 
of actively seeking a two-tiered system, whereby any person is above 
the law and free from ramifications, is extremely dangerous. 
Minimizing the judiciary is bad enough. Delegitimizing the           
judiciary is, for lack of a better phrase, playing with fire. Democracy is 
inherently tenuous or fragile. The undermining of the very                    
institution entrusted with justice for all and ensuring equal protection 
before the law demands a strong response. To ignore this deliberate 
attack is to be a bystander, exactly what a democracy under attack                      
cannot tolerate. 
Militant democracy demands a strong response to an attack on the 
judiciary, whether the attack comes from the executive branch, the leg-
islature, the media, or the public. Criticism is one thing; delegitimiza-
tion is something very different. Criticism is important and essential. 
Delegitimization, however, should not be tolerated. That is what Pres-
ident Beinisch’s clarion call highlights. 
Furthermore, when politicians attack democratic institutions, they 
legitimize anti-democratic extremism. Certainly, criticism of govern-
ment activity is necessary for a thriving democracy, but attacking dem-
ocratic institutions on the basis of their very existence and authority is 
something else entirely. When members of the government contend 
that government institutions, like the judiciary, lack legitimacy as a 
matter of political strategy, they incite extremists to do the same. They 




 101. Israel, like Great Britain, does not have a constitution. 
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In Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands today, there exist serious 
internal threats to democracy. In Germany, it is the ever-present white 
nationalist movement. White nationalist extremists are alive, well, and 
politically active in Germany today. In Israel, the greatest threat to de-
mocracy is again, the far-right. It is the far-right that the Israeli gov-
ernment has historically exercised its tools of militant democracy 
against and the threat remains today. Finally, in the Netherlands, it is 
the far-right that openly oppose and call out of the Moroccan popula-
tion on the basis of nothing more than biology and geography. But the 
Netherlands also faces a legitimate threat from Islamists as well. 
Like any true threat to democracy, the threats these three coun-
tries face are internal. Their collective feet are already in the door be-
cause the laws and processes allow them to be. Do the democracies of 
Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands run the risk then of being by-
standers to their individual extremist threats? While there is no clear 
answer to this question, history tells us that there are certain threats 
that are particularly insidious. In all three countries, the extremist 
threat has legitimate representation in political parties and the plat-
forms of those parties. The Alternative for Germany party in Ger-
many,102 the Jewish Home party in Israel,103 and the Party for Freedom 
in the Netherlands104 each represent some far-right ideals. 
While none of these three parties market themselves as extremist 
in view, they provide mainstream representation for extremist view-
points. Even though their party platforms, in the case of the Nether-
lands and Germany, are not explicitly anti-democratic in nature, mili-
tant democratic principles should still provide protection for 
democracy and society. This is especially important because many of 
the ideals of all three parties threaten minorities. 
 
 
 102. Jefferson Chase, AfD: What You Need to Know About Germany’s Far-Right Party, 
DW (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-
far-right-party/a-37208199. 
 103. See, e.g., Stuart Winer, Anger at Jewish Home Campaign Warning of Ultra-Orthodox 
Takeover in Jerusalem, TIMES OF ISR. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/jewish-
home-campaign-warning-of-ultra-orthodox-takeover-in-jerusalem-raises-ire/. 
 104. Ashley Kirk & Patrick Scott, Dutch Election: How the Far Right Could Win but Not 
Rule in a Country Known for Its Liberal Values, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/0/dutch-election-far-right-could-win-not-rule-country-known-liberal/. 
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Democracy, though by definition a majoritarian system, delegiti-
mizes itself when it fails to protect minorities. In light of this, it is un-
derstandable that some democracies can and should find themselves 
considering more militant responses to internal threats that seek to 
oppress minorities. Ultimately, the heart of the tension between mili-
tant and bystander democracy is the balance between majority and   
minority interests. 
Militant democracy invokes long standing principles. Hate speech 
and hate crime laws, party banning provisions, and constitutional lim-
itations on speech and political representation can be and are indefi-
nite, subject only to legislative changes. They cannot be reversed at the 
order of the executive. 
It is important to understand what sets militant democratic princi-
ples apart in order to understand their gravity. They should not be 
adopted or undertaken lightly. But the risks of undertaking these 
measures must be weighed against the cost of doing nothing. 
These balancing exercises are precisely what the government of 
Israel, Germany, and the Netherlands should be engaging in now. In 
each of these three countries the rise of the far-right, however it may 
differ among the three, poses a substantial threat to their democracies. 
Adopting the militant democracy principles articulated by Loewen-
stein, particularly regarding free speech and banning political parties, 
would significantly minimize the palpable danger to democratic value 
that is the essence of intolerance. Reflexively rejecting such an ap-
proach, opting for what we have defined as bystander democracy, 
opens the door to the harms highlighted throughout this article. The 
decision whether to apply militant democracy principles, in the name 
of preserving democracy requires recognition of internal threats and 
the harms imbued in them. This imposes on politicians the require-
ment to understand the dangers of hate, racism, and extremism. As 
history repeatedly demonstrates, a significant number of political lead-
ers have either ignored this reality or made a calculation that intoler-
ance can be tolerated. 
The list of victims of bystander democracy is unfathomably long. 
Tragically, it is an ever-growing list for the simple reason that the les-
sons of history are, far too often, relegated to the back shelves. It is 
seemingly easier to ignore threats than to address them, for that re-
quires both sensitivity to consequences and a willingness to confront 
the forces of darkness. 
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History illustrates the consequences of failing to respond to rac-
ism, extremism, and violence. The two measures analyzed in the 
pages above—limiting free speech and banning political parties—
when applied judiciously, with respect for the rule of law, subject to 
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review are the 
most effective way to preserve democracy while respecting                
democratic values.  
